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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the Allied-overseen Nuremberg Trials in 1945, the legal measures
pursued by nations negotiating political transition and responding to the human
rights abuses of prior regimes ("transitional justice")' are subject to examination
by the watchful eye of the international community and international standards.2
Despite the development of a "universalizing" rule of law, the subsequent
interplay of internationalist and nationalist responses to transition reveal a
continuing tension between the Nuremberg model of retribution and appeals for
J.D./Master of Theological Studies dual degree candidate, May 2006, Duke University School
of Law and Duke Divinity School; B.A., Brown University, 2001.
1. Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 HARv. HUm. RTS. J. 69 (2003).
2. See id. at 73 ("The period immediately following World War II was the heyday of international
justice. The critical turn away from the prior nationalist transitional responses and toward an internationalist
policy was thought to guarantee rule of law.").
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amnesty.3 Lately, as nations have sought a middle ground between retributive
justice and a "comprehensive policy of official amnesia,"4 truth commissions
have emerged as an increasingly popular model of restorative justice in times
of transition.' Whether confronting human rights abuses committed during
liberation conflicts6 or resulting from prior military regimes,7 the primary motif
of truth commissions is to narrate individual stories and acknowledge abuses
within the framework of a "jurisprudence of forgiveness and reconciliation"'
that abstracts discrete, local events into universally applicable themes. 9
Of these truth commissions, the chief model capturing the imagination of
the global community is South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(TRC).' ° The lion's share of the scholarship that exists concerning South
Africa's TRC revolves around its value as a form of restorative justice that
3. See id at 76 ("The profound and permanent significance of the Nuremberg model is that by
defining the rule of law in universalizing terms, it has become the standard by which all subsequent
transitional justice debates are framed. Whereas the [post-Nuremberg jurisprudence] simply assumed the
legitimacy of punishing human rights abuses, [in later years,] the tension between punishment and amnesty
was complicated by the recognition of dilemmas inherent in periods of political flux.").
4. John P. McCormick, Book Review, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 109, 111 (1999)
(reviewing David Dyzenhaus, JUDGING THE JUDGES, JUDGING OURSELVES: TRUTH, RECONCILIATION AND THE
APARTHEID LEGAL ORDER (1998)).
5. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311,436
n.509 (2002) ("[T]ruth commissions have been established in countries including Argentina, Bolivia, Chile,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, the Philippines, Rwanda, Somalia, South Africa, Uganda, and Uruguay."); Erin
Daly, Transformative Justice: Charting a Path to Reconciliation, 12 INT'L LEGAL PERsP. 73, 76-77
("Because truth commissions eschew both criminal prosecution on the one hand and blanket amnesty on the
other, they are often referred to as a 'middle path' or 'third course' or 'golden mean."'); Carrie J. Niebur
Eisnaugle, Note, An International Truth Commission: Utilizing Restorative Justice as an Alternative to
Retribution, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 209,224 (2003) ("Since [Argentina's creation of a truth commission
after its defeat in the Falkland Islands war,] more than 20 truth commissions have existed around the world
in the past 20 years.").
6. See Daly, supra note 5, at 77 ("[Tlhe Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was carefully
designed to attend to the particular ills that characterized South Africa at the end of the apartheid era.").
7. See John Dugard, Reconciliation and Justice: The South African Experience, 8 TRANSNAT'L
L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 277, 288 (1998) ("The truth commission for Argentina 4the National Commission for
the Disappeared was set up by President Raul Alfonsin in 1983 after the fall of the military junta and was
able to carry out thorough investigations into torture and disappearances.").
8. Teitel, supra note 1, at 81.
9. See id. at 81-82 ("The truth and reconciliation project incorporated much of its normative
discourse from outside the law, specifically from ethics, medicine, and theology ... Both political activism
and scholarship sought to move outside contemporary politics and history to represent conflict in timeless and
universal terms.") (emphasis added).
10. See Daly, supra note 5, at 77 ("While there have been truth commissions in the past, none has
been as successful or has garnered as much international attention as South Africa's,"); id. at 112 ("[T]he
international response to the TRC suggests that it, more than any other recent experiment in transitional
justice, is the beacon to which other emerging nations are looking.") (emphasis added).
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emphasizes ideological virtues dujour such as reconciliation, 1" communitarian
values, 12 or confession.'" In overwhelming measure, these reports rely on this
significant baseline assumption: South Africa's TRC was a success.14 This
article proposes that a critical gap 5 exists between the ideological weight that
the TRC carries within the international community and the political realities
initiating and controlling the TRC's development.
In establishing a productive critique of South Africa's experience with the
TRC, this article seeks to penetrate past pure ideology to ask whether, in fact,
South Africa's story is a wholly successful one, and to question the merit of its
development into an international metanarrative. Through a more critical lens
with which to view the TRC and truth commissions in general, it becomes
possible to properly review the situation of other nations, such as Rwanda, who
are attempting to borrow pages from South Africa's now-universalized
narrative. Truth commissions may be the cinderella of international law's
transitional justice models, but demythologizing the responses to civil conflict
and ethnic unrest in Africa requires a look at the political realities that informed
each country's choice to move toward restorative or punitive justice. 6
11. See Mark A. Druimbl, Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis in Rwanda, 75
N.Y.U L. REV. 1221, 1268 (2000) ("National reconciliation and individual rehabilitation are facilitated by
acknowledging the suffering of victims and their families, helping to resolve uncertain cases, and allowing
victims to tell their story, thus serving a therapeutic purpose for an entire country, and imparting to the
citizenry a sense of dignity and empowerment that could help them move beyond the pain of the past.")
(citation omitted).
12. Id. at 1270 (describing how truth commissions may respond to mass human rights violations
by "offering individual therapy, solidarity with other survivors, a dramaturgical recovery system, and, in the
end, group catharsis") (citation omitted).
13. See Teitel, supra note 1, at 83 (suggesting that truth commissions created a "move from the
courtroom to the hearing room and [a] turn to discursive confessional testimonials" which "tended to eschew
judgment and instead aimed to move beyond legal notions of guilt and responsibility").
14. See, e.g., Daly, supra note 5, at 112 ("[T]he TRC ... demonstrate[d] that values other than
retributive justice can and should be promoted during times of transition... However, the TRC's success in
South Africa does nothing to predict the success of other TRCs elsewhere."); Drumbl, supra note 11, at 1268
("Although certainly not without its criticisms and controversies, the overall evaluation of the TRC has been
a positive one"); Donald W. Shriver, Truth Commissions and Judicial Trials: Complementary or Antagonistic
Servants of Public Justice?, 16J.L &RELIGION 1, 16 (2001) ("One of the great services of the South African
TRC to the formation of a new national political culture was its back-and-forth dialogue between victims and
perpetrators ... "); Eisnaugle, supra note 5, at 224 ("Out of all the truth commissions that have operated since
the surge began, South Africa's TRC has emerged as the best example of restorative justice ideals and
practices on a national level.").
15. See Teitel, supra note 1, at 85 ("Existing scholarship has not yet captured the prevailing dynamic
of transitional justice or its nexus with ongoing political change.").
16. See Okechukwu Oko, Confronting Transgressions of Prior Military Regimes Towards a More
Pragmatic Approach, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 89, 95 (2003) ("[T]here is no guarantee that what
worked in one country will be appropriate in another country with dramatically different social, political and
cultural assumptions.").
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In Part I, this article outlines the background to South Africa's TRC, and
subsequently critiques the prevailing international perspective on South Africa
as a successful model of the restorative justice ideology. By contrast, this article
argues that the animating principles for the Commission were political, rather
than ideological. Part II provides a brief outline of the TRCs structure, and sub-
sequently develops an intellectual history for the birth of the TRC as a restora-
tive justice metanarrative. Here, the discussion seeks to illustrate how the
reconciliation myth at the heart of the South African experience is precisely
that-a myth that resonates for a newly globalized community that is increas-
ingly responsive in a categorical way to restorative justice. In analytical
partnership with Part II, Part III examines the fundamental premises of truth
commissions, and in particular, the usefulness of past-oriented, confessional
methods of response to political transition. In particular, this portion of the
article engages with the most recent sociological scholarship and legal theory
to militate against the notion of revisiting the past as an ideological end and a
productive means of transitional justice. Finally, Part IV examines the current
situation in post-genocide Rwanda as a relevant case study. After providing
background to the human rights abuses in Rwanda, this article examines
Rwanda's present attempt at developing a Gacaca court system from the
rehabilitated critical lens of the South African experience.
11. CRITIQUING THE METANARRATIVE
A. Apartheid and Background to South Africa's TRC
A contextual understanding of South Africa's TRC requires a close exa-
mination of the definitive features of apartheid, a policy of "racial separateness"
that broadly distinguished "whites" ("Europeans") from "non-whites" ("non-
Europeans"), with the latter category encompassing the racial labels of
"African" (black), "colored," and "Indian."' 7 Unlike human rights abuses in
other countries or generations, apartheid was "a system of oppression that was
defined by law."' 8 The underlying push of apartheid was not the result of a mob
culture, unsupported by dominant governmental entities. Rather, with the elec-
tion victory of D.F. Malan and the Nationalist Party in 1948,'9 South Africa's
primary civil structures began to serve as a buttress for human rights abuses.2"
17. RICHARD SPITZ & MATTHEW CHASKALSON, THE POLITICS OF TRANsITION: A HIDDEN HISTORY
OF SOUTH AFRICA'S NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT 4 (2000).
18. Daly, supra note 5, at 113.
19. SPITZ & CHASKALSON, supra note 17.
20. See Daly, supra note 5, at 114 ("A strong legal framework, including all branches of
government, succeeding constitutions, and a vast array of laws duly passed by Parliament, supported this
[Vol, 12:41
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Ultimately, under the parliamentary sovereignty that typified the apartheid era,
members who were unrepresentative of the non-white majority2 could exercise
essentially unlimited power to enact laws which generated profoundly
oppressive measures against South African blacks.22
The political roots of apartheid have a deep historical reach, and for that
reason, understanding the development of the TRC requires examining how
oppressive ideals reified through the passage of time. During the period of
British occupation of South African territory in the early nineteenth century,
policies of separation became pervasive: blacks were segregated in their living
environments, places of employment, and education; political participation by
the black majority was forbidden or stymied by the white minority in power;
property ownership was largely only a possibility for whites.23 Moreover, when
the country's first parliament formed in 1910, enacted legislation continued to
reinforce the policy of inequity, including the passage of the Natives Land Act
of 1913, which precluded blacks from land transactions and paved the way
toward both political and practical dispossession of the black majority.24
Although South Africa's early colonial period nurtured a culture of racial
inequity, apartheid came to a head in legislative terms after the Nationalist Party
(NP) gained power in the mid-twentieth century. In a single decade
(1950-1959), laws were enacted to register every South African as a member
of a specific racial group,26 force black Africans to carry passes,27 restrict the
system of oppression."). However, while apartheid was not a haphazard system of government, its execution
was not without difficulty. Id. See KENNETH CHRISTIE, THE SOUTH AFRICAN TRUTH COMMISSION 21 (2000)
("[Apartheid] was a policy which saw many internal struggles and contradictions; it was revised over and over
again and these uncertainties, conflicts, failures and deviations, although often less visible than the continuities
and triumphs of Apartheid, were fundamental to its development.").
21. Daly, supranote 5, at 114.
22. See id. (observing that these legislated oppressions included: racial registration laws,
segregation laws, dispossession laws, removal laws, pass laws, suppression of expression and assembly laws,
detention laws, disenfranchisement laws, dis-employment laws, dis-education laws, anti-miscegenation laws,
and anti-injunction laws).
23. Cassandra Fox Charles, Truth v. Justice: Promoting the Rule of Law in Post-Apartheid South
Africa, 5 ST. MARY'S L. REV ON MINORITY ISSUEs 81, 85 (2002).
24. Id.; see CHRISTIE, supra note 20, at 12 ("[The] Land Act of 1913 ... limited black ownership
to 13 per cent of the country.").
25. See SPITz & CHASKALSON, supra note 17, at 4 ("The National Party government's objective was
to make South Africa a country run by whites for whites only, and particularly for those of Afrikaner descent.
Its intentions, as well as the extent to which it sought to reserve the power of enforcement to the executive,
were quickly laid bare by its enactment of a series of laws.").
26. See id. ("The Population Registration Act of 1950 provided for the compilation of a register of
the entire population, designed to allocate every person in South Africa to a particular racial group.").
27. See id. ("[The Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents Act of 1952,] contrary to the
apparent meaning of its title, required all black Africans to carry detailed 'reference books', commonly known
as 'passes'.").
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right of black Africans to live in white urban areas,28 create separate political
and educational structures, 29 establish racially exclusive residential locations,3"
and prevent non-white South Africans from voting.3 Moreover, not only did
the National Party enact legislation to perpetuate apartheid, they also worked to
prevent opposition to the new legal measures.32 For example, the Internal
Security Act of 1950 prohibited listed individuals and organizations from pro-
moting "ideologies and activities opposed to white domination or apartheid."33
The likeminded Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1953 punished civil
disobedience with a three-year prison sentence.34 These and similar enactments
stymied the possibility of effective opposition by the African National Congress
(ANG) and other organizations critical of the apartheid legislation.35
Through the next thirty years, the political tension surrounding the issue
of apartheid increased steadily as the Nationalist Party sought to suppress an
increasingly violent reaction against apartheid, buttressed separatist policies,
and initiated only cosmetic reforms (which were largely enacted for economic
reasons).3 6 In particular, when H. F. Verwoerd served as the Prime Minister of
South Africa from 1958 to 1966, the tenor of apartheid resistance shifted toward
violence.37 After the police shot and killed sixty-nine people and wounded 180
others during what was intended to be a peaceful protest in March 1960 at
Sharpeville (the "Sharpeville massacre"), both the African National Congress
and the Pan Africanist Congress moved their organizations underground38 and
28. See id. ("Section 10 of the Black (Native) Laws Amendment Act of 1952 restricted the right of
blacks to live in the white urban areas to those who had been born there, those who had lived there
continuously for fifteen years, and those who had worked continuously for the same employer for ten years.").
29. Id. ("[The Nationalist Party tried] to resuscitate tribal forms of political authority in the
'reserves' . . . in the hope that black political and other aspirations could be accommodated there. Meanwhile
the Bantu Education Act of 1953, which transferred the responsibility for the administration of black education
to the Department of Native Affairs, initiated the establishment of separate education systems for whites and
blacks .... ').
30. See SpiTz & CHASKALSON, supra note 17, at 4-5 ("The Group Areas Act of 1950 provided that
areas not already set aside for blacks could be made racially exclusive--with the adverse impact borne by
coloreds and Indians, who were forced to live in wretched and overcrowded locations.").
31. See id. at 5 ("In 1956 the government disenfranchised coloreds in the Cape, thereby removing




35. SPrrz & CtASALSON, supra note 17, at 5.
36. See id. at 9 ("The Nationalists came to recognize the economy's dependence on black labor, and
began a course of limited reforms designed to bring black workers into the state's economic infrastructure.").
37. Id. at 6.
38. Id. Both organizations were banned by the government under the Unlawful Organizations Act
of 1960. Id at 7.
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created military wings.39 For many moderates, the 1960s ushered in a forcible
awareness that non-violent resistance may have gained the movement
international sympathy, but little substantive change.,
Although hostility between the two camps increased throughout the 1970s,
the Nationalist government successfully thwarted any active form of armed
rebellion through a series of authoritarian measures geared to sustain the
apartheid regime. 1 Under Verwoerd, the ideological voice behind the apartheid
state, the homeland system was created, which further reified racial segrega-
tion.42 The homeland process forced millions of blacks to exchange their South
African citizenship for citizenship specific to a homeland. 43 In creating home-
lands in the reserves, the government hoped to "absorb 'economically
superfluous' blacks" while allowing economically "'useful' blacks to remain
in the cities (although often in poverty)."
The development of the homeland system accentuated an intensifying rift
between those who were otherwise united against apartheid. In particular, the
liberation movement was divided with regard to whether dialogue with the
ruling civil power structures was necessary or productive.45 While Chief
Mangosuthu Buthelezi of the KwaZulu territory argued that participation in the
national political structures could prevent black homelands from being cast
aside with an unwanted independence and blacks from being stripped of their
South African citizenship, the ANC criticized his stance, arguing that
Buthelezi's Inkatha movement merely supported the political fiction of a
productive yet separate development.' The rift within the resistance movement
diverged most notably after the Soweto Uprising in June 1976.4' Largely the
product of a reaction against the mandate of Afrikaans as the language for state
education in black schools, a dramatically unsuccessful rebellion occurred in
which hundreds of protesters were killed and thousands injured or exiled.4" In
39. SPrrz & CHASKALSON, supra note 17, at 7.
40. Id.
41. CHRIsTIE, supra note 20, at 27 ("[B]y the mid 1970s the armed struggle in South Africa had to
all intents and purposes ground to a halt. Little was seen or heard of the ANC during this period.").
42. SPITZ & CHAsKALSoN, supra note 17.
43. Id.
44. Id. (quoting an unnamed source).
45. See id. at 8 ("Several of the homelands, though slow to release themselves from Pretoria's
shackles, became progressively less subservient to the South African government and more interested in
bringing about an end to the apartheid system to which they owed their status. Others attempted to prop up
the system and their role in it.").
46. Id.
47. See SPITZ & CHASKALSON, supra note 17, at 8-9.
48. Id. at8.
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the wake of the uprising, the resistance movement found itself at an internal
crossroads: while Buthelezi believed that black lives were needlessly wasted in
the attempt, the ANC emerged adamant to engage in a resuscitated armed
struggle.49 Indeed, until and throughout the formal negotiations between the
resistance leaders and the South African government in 1990, Nelson Mandela,
the deputy president of the ANC, affirmed that armed struggle was a legitimate
form of self-defense when confronted with morally repugnant government
structures." The division within the resistance merely underscores the
complexity of South Africa's political terrain during the grand apartheid years.
In the final decade of apartheid, although the Nationalist government
enacted a series of superficial reforms in response to a growing realization of
South Africa's economic dependence on the black population,5 those measures
could not conceal the increasingly apparent failures of the separatist system.
Acknowledging that South Africa had to "'adapt or die,"' P.W. Botha
inaugurated policies from the late 1970s into the 1980s that purported to
encourage "a united South Africa, with one citizenship and a universal
franchise,"52 but the developed measures merely perpetuated the existing
system. For example, although the 1983 Constitution created a tricameral
Parliament with distinct chambers for coloreds and Indians, these chambers
remained subordinate to the largely white President's Council.53 Likewise,
although some of the most egregious apartheid measures were repealed,
including prohibitions on mixed marriages and segregation on public
transportation, the ruling minority still denied the black majority the opportunity
for full rights. 4
49. Id. at 8-9.
50. See Peter N. Bouckaert, Note, The Negotiated Revolution: South Africa's Transition to a
Multiracial Democracy, 33 STAN. J. INT'L L. 375, 386 (1997) ("I am in prison as the representative of the
people and your organization, the African National Congress, which was banned. What freedom am I being
offered while the organization of the people remains banned?... Only free men can negotiate. Prisoners
cannot enter into contracts.") cited in SHEIDAN JoHNS & R. HUNT DAVIS, MANDELA, TAMBO, AND THE
AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS: TiE STRUGGLE AGAINST APARTHEID 1948-1990 at 215 (1991).
51. See SPITZ & CHASKALSON, supra note 17, at 9 ("The Nationalists came to recognize the
economy's dependence on black labor, and began a course of limited reforms designed to bring black workers
into the state's economic infrastructure. Yet they never considered granting full political rights to blacks.").
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 10.
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The South Africa of 1985-1990 was in a perpetual state of emergency.55
Politically, the constitutional structure of South Africa and the demands of
popular will were at odds.56 Less than 20 percent of South Africa's population
could engage in the democratic political game, and a robust form of judicial
review was consistently rejected by the ruling party in South Africa throughout
the twentieth century. 7 Indeed, the concept of a bill of rights as a component
of a new constitutional order was anathema to anAfrikaanerdom tradition which
gave priority to the State over the interests of the individual.58 The legacy of
apartheid was not merely a government-enforced racism or segregated civil
power structures. In the socio-economic sphere, apartheid's repercussions were
devastating: income inequality in South Africa had reached catastrophic heights,
with the white minority (approximately 15 percent of the population) earning
on average eight times the income of the black majority (approximately 75
percent of the population); the top 5 percent of the population consumed more
than the bottom 85 percent; four white conglomerates held 87 percent of the
land and 95 percent of South Africa's productive capital. 9
In light of the incontrovertible problems South Africa was facing, when
F.W. de Klerk replaced Botha as the National Party Leader and State President
in August 1989, a period of "cautiously reformist policy" transitioned quickly
into a period pregnant with the possibility of more radical reform measures.6 '
Although many were surprised by De Klerk's responsiveness to systemic
changes,62 his willingness to dialogue with the resistance leaders-represented
55. See id. at I I ("In July 1985 President Botha declared a nationwide state of emergency which
gave the government even greater powers and discretion to implement detention without trial, to break up the
smallest gatherings, and generally to suppress political activity. The state of emergency was renewed each
June until 1990.").
56. Ran Hirschl, The Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment Through Constitutionalization:
Lessons from Four Constitutional Revolutions, 25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 91, 135 (2000) ("Prior to the
enactment of the 1993 interim Bill of Rights ... there was perhaps no other country in the postwar world in
which the gap between popular will and constitutional arrangements was quite so wide.").
57. SPITZ & CHAsKALSON, supra note 17, at II.
58. Id.
59. Hirschl, supra note 56, at 136.
60. SpiZ & CHAsKALSON, supra note 17, at 13.
61. In part, the NP's willingness to entertain more radical reform was due to a withdrawal of support
from dominant global players such as the United States. During the Cold War era, South Africa garnered
international support by "characterizing its struggle with the liberation forces as a fight against communism."
See Bouckaert, supra note 50, at 378. With the Soviet Union's collapse, the semiotic worth of South Africa
in stymieing communism diminished. See id. ("Stripped of its anticommunist cloak, the South African
government was exposed as an anomalous minority regime which brutally oppressed its majority African
population.").
62. See Sprrz & CHASKALSON, supra note 17, at 13 ("Many observers were surprised, having
thought De Klerk to be conservative and suddenly finding him to be more radical than they had believed.").
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by his willingness to release Mandela and other prominent ANC and South
African Communist Party (SACP) leaders and enter into negotiations with
them--illustrated the diversity of opinion within the National Party.63 This
diversity was even more apparent in National Party members such as Roelf
Meyer, Leon Wessels, and Dawie de Villiers, whose leftist positions were
integral to the subsequent dialogues." As a result of the new leadership, the
mentality toward negotiations shifted. In a watershed speech during the opening
of Parliament on February 2, 1990, De Klerk declared: "[O]nly a negotiated
understanding among the representative leaders of the entire population is able
to ensure lasting peace." 5 With a changing of the guard, new leadership
realized the need for a new platform for negotiation.
B. The TRC as a Political Settlement
Effectively at a deadlock in 1990, both the National Party (NP) and the
African National Congress realized that some form of political settlement could
not be avoided." While the NP perceived a political re-ordering as the only
means of resuscitating a failing economy, the ANC viewed a settlement as a
requisite move toward dismantling white hegemony.67 The backdrop for these
negotiations was a series of dramatic reforms announced by De Klerk during his
momentous February 2, 1990 address to Parliament: the legalization of several
black liberation organizations (including Umkhonto) and the SACP, the release
of political prisoners (including the unconditional release of Mandela), and the
promise to develop a new, democratic national constitution through dialogue
between the NP and the newly-legalized organizations.68 In the Pretoria Minute
of August 7, 1990, the ANC formally suspended armed struggle, committed to
the negotiating table, and affirmed the bilateral commitment characterizing the
negotiations.69 The violence between the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party
63. See id. at 14 ("[F]actional differences within the governing party were reflected in generational
differences. Many of the party's 'elder statesmen', including Botha, were reactionaries. Their rise within the
NP paralleled the evolution of apartheid from 1948. For Botha to have started major changes would have
amounted to a repudiation of his political heritage.").
64. Roelf Meyer in particular established important links between the National Party and the ANC;
see id. at 13 ("[Meyer's] constant line of communication with the ANC's Cyril Rampahosa--the Meyer-
Ramaphosa 'channel'-became an indispensable feature of the negotiated transition.").
65. SPITZ & CHASKALSON, supra note 17, at 15 (quoting Hansard, 2-9 Feb. 1990, cols. 1-2 (Cape
Town: Government Printer)).
66. See Bouckaert, supra note 50, at 379 ("The ANC and the NP each came to the table with the
realization that they had reached a stalemate in their often bloody struggle for power.").
67. SPITZ & CHASKAI.SON, supra note 17, at 14.
68. Bouckaert, supra note 50, at 387.
69. See id. at 388 ("We are convinced that what we have agreed upon today can become a milestone
on the road to true peace and prosperity for our country. In this we do not pretend to be the only parties
(Vol. 12:41
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(IFP) continued and ground negotiations to a standstill in the townships.7"
However, with the mediating help of an interfaith group of church leaders led
by Frank Chikane, the government and ANC moved out of political deadlock
and signed the National Peace Accord in September 1991, a multilateral
commitment to pursuing peace.7'
Formally, what would be an arduous process of constitution-making began
at Kempton Park (outside Johannesburg) in December 1991 with the Conven-
tion for a Democratic South Africa (or "CODESA I").72 As a foundational step,
CODESA I established a multilateral movement toward a common vision. In
the Declaration of Intent, a near-unanimous portion of the attendees pledged
their commitment to a "united, nonracial and non-sexist state [and] multiracial
democracy. '71 Moreover, the conference established five working groups
focused on the following topics: establishing a free political climate, developing
a constitution, forming a transitional government, reincorporating the home-
lands, and deciding time frames for the transition.74
When negotiations resumed in May 1992 through CODESA II, the
dialogue between the government and the ANC again grew tense as discussions
began to implicate questions of who would gain or retain power in the transi-
tional government. Although the two factions agreed on a number of principles,
deadlocking the negotiations was the issue of what number would constitute the
decision-making majority in the different regions.75 In the wake of a stymied
conference, violent incidents took place, including an attack on the ANC by IFP
hostel dwellers, an event which cost forty-nine lives and threatened the
negotiation process as a whole.7 6 Subsequent to this attack, the Ciskei Military
killed twenty-eight people ANC protestors who had entered the homeland.77
Faced with these examples of spiraling violence,78 South Africa solicited
involved in the process of shaping the new South Africa... All of us henceforth walk that road in consultation
and cooperation with each other.") (quoting TIMOTHY D. SisK, DEMOCRATIZATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE
ELUSIVE SOCIAL CONTRAcT 94 (1995)).
70. Bouckaert, supra note 50, at 387.
71. Id.
72. SPITZ & CHASKALSON, supra note 17, at 18.
73. Bouckaert, supra note 50, at 390.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 391 ("The ANC saw the issue [of the majority size for decision-making authority] in
light of its commitment to democratic majority rule and as an attempt to preserve minority privilege, and both
sides refused to budge.").
76. Id.
77. Id. at 392.
78. See Marianne Geula, Note, South Africa's Truth andReconciliation Commission as an Alternate
Means ofAddressing Transitional Government Conflicts in aDivided Society, 18B.U. INT'L L.J. 57,61 (2000)
("The ferocity of the violence, both within South Africa and in the bordering countries, heightened the
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international intervention; ultimately, however, the international response did
not prove instrumental in the negotiation process.79
When productive negotiations did resume, they resumed as a result of
encouragement from a surprising comer of the discussions: Joes Slovo,
Chairman of the South African Communist Party and commander of Unikhonto,
ANCs military wing.8" Few people were ambivalent toward Slovo, a white
South African who was an established and controversial political voice. 8' In his
groundbreaking 1992 article, "What Room for Compromise?," Slovo argued
that the power imbalance between the South African government and the
resistance movement made an unconditional surrender by the ruling regime an
unrealistic goal.82  Rather, the "dangerous radical813 counseled compromise,
suggesting that the focus of negotiations should remain on "the acceptability of
the package as a whole," rather than "minor details" such as those which were
currently shackling productive dialogue among the factions.84 In his article,
Slovo outlined essential features85 which compromise could not diminish,
including: a mutually agreed upon compendium of constitutional principles, a
permanent constitution adopted by a sovereign, democratically-elected body,
and a specific plan for transition toward democracy.86 Yet, Slovo also suggested
areas in which compromise might be justified, such as a "sunset clause"
allowing for a discrete period in which power could be shared between the
regimes, an informal agreement resolving the regional power dispute, general
amnesty for past crimes, and employment benefits for civil servants and security
realization among the major parties that this stalemate might only be resolved through extreme bloodshed or
negotiation.").
79. See Bouckaert, supra note 50, at 391-92 ("[T]he United Nations sent peace observers to work
with the National Peace Accord and Goldstone Commission structures, and urged other international
organizations to do the same ... However, in contrast to its interventionist approach in Yugoslavia and
Somalia, the United Nations seemed intent on forcing the parties in South Africa to formulate their own
solution to the problem.").
80. Id. at 392.
81. See id. ("[Among many white South Africans,] Slovo was seen as a dangerous radical and as
the ultimate traitor to his race. Conversely, few whites in South Africa could compete with Slovo for the love
and admiration he received from black South Africans.").
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Bouckaert, supra note 50, at 393.
85. See id. (Conversely, Slovo also listed "impermissible" features, including: a minority veto
applied to the writing of the constitution, a mandatory power-sharing regime, a permanent agreement





personnel.87 Ultimately, through meetings in January and February of 1993 (the
"Kempton Park Talks"), Slovo's suggestions became the structural model which
was at the center of a tentative agreement between the once deeply divided ANC
and South African government. 8
With the resuscitation of the negotiation process, several factors
subsequently enabled the process to move more quickly toward conclusion.
First, after the assassination of Chris Hani, a popular ANC leader, Mandela
counseled for sobriety.89 Indeed, the assassination had the counterintuitive
effect of provoking the ANC toward a quicker resolution to the talks, including
the establishment of an April 27, 1994 date to the first democratic elections.'
Second, although the government and ANC sought external support for their
bilateral agreement in May 1993, the compromises proved untenable for right
wing extremists, who subsequently left the negotiating table,9' clearing the
political road considerably. 92 Third, the global community offered more explicit
support of the negotiation process and its resolution.93 Bearing witness to the
international awareness and endorsement of the transitional process ensuing in
South Africa, Mandela and De Klerk would share the Nobel Peace Prize in
1993.94
Although the formal negotiations inaugurated at CODESA I, CODESA II,
and the subsequent Kempton Park Talks were directed toward the construction
of a workable constitution, it is impossible to understand why the TRC was
defined as a political settlement without accounting for the politics of the
constitution-making. Although the TRC did not begin its hearings until 1996,
it was negotiated and is anticipated in the "postamble" to South Africa's Interim
Constitution, which states in relevant part:
In order to advance such reconciliation and reconstruction, amnesty
shall be granted in respect of acts, omissions and offences associated
87. Id.
88. See id. at 394 ("I[T]he National Executive Committee of the ANC adopted Slovo's proposals as
the strategic perspective which would guide the ANC through the negotiations, and returned to the negotiating
table.").
89. Bouckaert, supra note 50, at 394.
90. Id.
91. See id. at 395 (Although the Inkantha Freedom Party (1FP) and the extremist white right left to
form the Freedom Alliance, opposed to the transition process, the violence which the Freedom Alliance incited
merely "inflicted [damage] on the image of the highly splintered right-wing movement.").
92. See id at 394 ("The walkout and the violence which ensued had the positive effect of
strengthening the center and allowing the remaining parties to resolve additional points of dispute more
quickly.").
93. Id. at 396.
94. Bouckaert, supra note 50, at 396.
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with political objectives and committed in the course of the conflicts
of the past. To this end, Parliament under this Constitution shall
adopt a law determining a firm cut-offdate, which shall be dated after
8 October 1990 and before 6 December 1993, and providing for the
mechanisms, criteria and procedures, including tribunals, if any,
through which such amnesty shall be dealt with at any time after the
law has been passed.95
The postamble to the Interim Constitution sought to provide a recapitula-
tion of the Constitution's proposals for the future of South Africa in lay terms
96
and was the product of negotiations similar to that which defined the entire
constitution-building process.
Despite being the product of one of the last nights of negotiation and
"tacked on" to the Interim Constitution, it would be historical revision to argue
from those facts that the postamble was politically an afterthought of the
negotiations process. 97 Rather, a central argument of this article is that the
political momentum (and, at times, deadlock) occasioned by the negotiations
process found a necessary resolution in the drafting of the postamble, and as a
result, predated the political settlement that was the TRC. The preceding
context of the negotiations as a whole-a process which spanned three years
and ten months, from February 1990 to November 19939s-provides the neces-
sary backdrop to the political tension preceding the drafting of the postamble
and the formal completion of the Interim Constitution. From the outset of the
negotiations during 1993, a central problem emerging across the negotiation
table was whether leaders in the Nationalist Party government were subject to
prosecution or extradition."
For those involved in the negotiation process, the question of legal
response to NP leaders was a live one, for at that point, apartheid had been
deemed in violation of international law."0 In its initial form, the Constitution
95. SPITZ & CHAKALSON, supra note 17, at 412.
96. See id. ("This Constitution provides a historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided
society characterized by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice, and a future founded on the recognition
of human rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence and development opportunities for all South Africans,
irrespective of colored, race, class, belief or sex. The pursuit of national unity, the well-being of all South
African citizens and peace, require reconciliation between the people of South Africa and the reconstruction
of society.").
97. Id. at 413.
98. Id. at 414.
99. See Geula, supra note 78, at 62 ("Whether the leaders of the NP government could be subjected
to prosecution or extradition under international law remained an open question.").
100. See John Dugard, Reconciliation and Justice: The South African Experience, 8 TRANSNAT'L
L. & CONTEM]. PRoBs. 277, 291(1998) ("Although apartheid was an international crime there was no
suggestion from the United Nations, following the peaceful transition from apartheid to democracy between
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contained no amnesty clause; indeed, ANC leaders were not only adamant in
their refusal to entertain the notion of blanket amnesty, but sought a closer
investigation of potential excesses on the part of the NP government.'" In
effect, the political terrain of both South Africa's history as well as the
immediate context of the negotiations process led the bargaining parties to a
standoff: in the period of the negotiations, because South Africa's situation no
longer presented a viable threat to international peace, an international criminal
tribunal (such as that created for Rwanda under the UN Charter's Chapter VII
powers) was not justified. z Moreover, while the new regime could decide to
prosecute NP leaders for their involvement with apartheid, prosecution would
have been politically untenable given the NP government's active presence
throughout the constitution-making process and transition period.'0 3 As a result
of the political landscape at the culmination of an already beleaguered series of
talks, only two alternatives remained: unconditional (blanket) amnesty or
conditional amnesty for specific individuals."°4 As the postamble illustrates the
result of political negotiation-and indeed, the means inaugurating South
Africa's democratic state-was the constitutional inclusion of conditional
amnesty for "political" crimes.0 5
III. THE BIRTH OF A METANARRATIVE
Understanding the Truth and Reconciliation as first and foremost a political
settlement need not eviscerate the TRC of its ontological worth. However, as
1990 and 1994, that those responsible for the worst features of apartheid should be brought to international
justice.").
101. Geula, supra note 78, at 61-62.
102. Dugard, supra note 100.
103. Id. at 291-92 (noting that the National Party likely expected to be "rewarded with places in a
government of national unity" functioning under an interim Constitution).
104. Id. at 292.
105. What constitutes "political objectives" for the purposes of conditional amnesty remains the
subject of great debate. See, e.g., Ronald Slye, Justice andAmnesty, in LOOKING BACK, REACHING FORWARD:
REFLEIIONS ON THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SouTH AFRICA 174, 179 (Charles Villa-
Vicencio & Wilhelm Verwoerd eds., 2000) [hereinafter LOOKING BACK] ("While all states accept in principle
the legitimacy of the political office exception, there is no consensus on the definition, interpretation, and
application of the exception."); Anurima Bhargava, Defining Political Crimes: A Case Study of the South
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 102 COLuM. L. REv. 1304 (2002) ("Determining whether an
act was associated with a political objective, or, articulated more broadly, how a political crime should be
defined, presented considerable difficulty to the Committee."); Emily H. McCarthy, South Africa's Amnesty
Process: A Viable Route Toward Truth and Reconciliation?, 3 MICH. J. RACE & L. 183, 213 (1997)
("Conceivably, [the political amnesty clause] gives the Committee the discretion to deny amnesty for certain
acts, even if they served a political goal, on the grounds that the 'political' act in question was too horrific or
disproportional to the goal pursued to qualify for amnesty.").
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this article argues, to understand the TRC outside its political context-and in
an artificial marriage to pure ideology-is to generate a metanarrative that may
ultimately prove a fiction, to the detriment of its advocates and adherents. This
article militates against that (pervasive) perception of the TRC, and instead,
seeks a more balanced perspective, one which can better gauge the application
(or non-application) of the TRC to the experiences of states engaging the
restorative justice question. In this discussion, the initial section will set out the
element of the TRC as they developed subsequent to the drafting of the Interim
Constitution. Subsequently, the discussion shifts to the international commun-
ity's reaction toward the South African experience, and analyzes whether that
experience has been justly interpreted. Under the thesis of this article, the
international community has not, in fact, portrayed the TRC in an objective
fashion, and instead, developed a restorative justice mythology that continues
to be perpetuated today.
A. Forming the TRC: Process and Elements
Although the formal legislation inaugurating the TRC was not enacted until
two years after the completion of the Interim Constitution, the outline for its
existence was foundationally negotiated through the series of political
compromises between the National Party and the African National Congress. 6
However, while the general concept-conditional amnesty-may have been a
negotiated and settled concept, the precise mechanism by which that amnesty
could be granted remained opaque.'0 7 Complicating matters was the realization
that a context-appropriate model for the TRC might prove difficult to find. A
pivotal player in the early discussions concerning the TRC, Minister for Water
Affairs Kader Asmal, articulated these difficulties: "[t]here is no prototype that
can be automatically used in South Africa. We will be guided, to a greater or
lesser extent, by experiences elsewhere, notably in those countries that managed
to handle this highly sensitive-even dangerous-process with success. But at
the end of the day, what is most important is the nature of our particular
settlement and how best we can consolidate the transition in South Africa."'
0 8
Although South Africa was not without precedent to consult in the creation
of its TRC, South Africa was distinguished as the first such attempt to officially
106. See LYN S. GRAYBILL, TRUTH & RECONCILIATION IN SoUTH AFRICA: MIRACLE OR MODEL? 2
(2002) ("The whole notion of amnesty in the TRC ... was largely the outcome of various compromises that
had been hammered out between the African National Congress (ANC) and the National Party (NP) in the
transition period leading to the adoption of an interim constitution in 1993, with input from twenty-six
political parties.").
107. See id. at 3 ("Although amnesty had been agreed to in the interim constitution, the procedures
had been left open.").
108. Id. at 1 (quoting THE HEALING OF A NATION? 27 (Alex Boraine & Janet Levy eds., 1994)).
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invite public debate and engagement with the practical development of a truth
commission.'0 9 At the outset, when nongovernmental organizations, spiritual
leaders, and human-rights lawyers first began discussing the possibility of a
truth commission as a means of transitional justice for South Africa," the
creators of the Commission turned to prior truth commissions in Brazil,
Argentina, Chile, and El Salvador for practical guidance."' In fact, in 1994, the
Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) sponsored two conferences
which allowed delegates from Chile, Argentina, and eastern and central Europe
to narrate their own context-specific struggles in dealing with former members
of oppressive regimes." 2 These conferences served to increase the public
dialogue concerning the potentially problematic features of the truth commis-
sion model of restorative justice."3 For example, when considering the Latin
American examples, a problem that featured prominently in each situation was
difficulty in maintaining accountability for uncooperative perpetrators of
crimes." 4 Borrowing from the flawed histories of these prior truth commis-
sions, the creators of the TRC wanted to ensure the cooperation of those
involved in the human rights violations in South Africa's apartheid history." 5
Although South Africa's TRC was the first truth commission to be
established by Parliament rather than presidential decree," 6 the legislative
process remained a "patchwork of all the viewpoints of the country,""' and
others have maintained that the enactment of the Truth and Reconciliation Act
remained very much a settlement of political compromises." 8 On several
points, the legislative momentum could have ground to a halt. From May 1994
through March 1995, the parliamentary Standing Committee on Justice (whose
109. See GRAYB1LL, supra note 106.
110. See Eisnaugle, supra note 5, at 224 ("The idea that something like the TRC would be necessary
in order to help ease South Africa's transition from the system of apartheid to a democratic system was first
developed by nongovernmental organizations, religious leaders, and human-rights lawyers.").
111. Id.
112. GRAYBILL, supra note 106.
113. Id.
114. See Eisnaugle, supra note 5, at 224-25 ("The creators of South Africa's truth commission
quickly realized that many of the truth commissions in Latin America failed to get the cooperation of the
perpetrators of crimes that had been committed. For example, Chile's truth commission, the Rettig
Commission, possessed no judicial powers. This lack of power meant that the commission could not establish
culpability or impose penalties.").
115. Id. at 225.
116. GRAYBILL, supra note 106, at 3.
117. Id.at2-3.
118. See id. at 3 ("The process reflects to a certain degree party political compromises and not so
much 'the will of the people."'); see also CHRISTIE, supra note 20, at 81 ("The TRC was to some extent driven
by ANC directives and to some extent by various different groups within civil society.").
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members spanned all the major political parties) met to hold public hearings
asking for recommendations concerning the draft legislation, debate these
recommendations, and drafting the legislation itself."9  Illustrating the
difficulties of the process, in March 1995, the Committee met daily and ulti-
mately invested 127 hours before tabling the draft to the National Assembly. 120
When Parliament passed the bill on May 17, 1995, nearly a year had elapsed
since its presentation. '
2
Among the several potential areas for political deadlock was the concern
over whether the amnesty hearings should be held in secret. 22 The National
Party objected early to the clause in the initial draft of the bill declaring that the
committee and sub-committee meetings would be open to the public.1 23 After
further deliberation, the bill was only accepted with a concessionary "secrecy
clause.' ' 124 To the NPs detractors, the clause constituted a desire to obfuscate the
history of what had occurred or avoid indictment, a violation of the Bill of
Rights, and an affront to both the victims and survivors of apartheid. 25 Rising
to the NPs defense, others argued that secrecy was necessary to protect
witnesses.126 However, faced with overwhelming external support of public
hearings,' 27 the Committee ultimately overturned the cabinet's decision to
include a secrecy clause and returned to a draft which allowed for public hear-
ings with provisional conditions on when in-camera hearings would be
allowed. 121
Further complicating the political process of drafting the Truth and
Reconciliation Act was the choice of commissioners. 129 After rejecting an initial
suggestion that commissioners be appointed by the president as inviting political
favoritism, most of the parties to the process agreed on creating a consulate
119. GRAYBILL, supra note 106, at 2.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. CHRISTIE, supra note 20, at 83.
123. Id. at84.
124. Id.
125. See id. ("[Plerhaps the most damning view of this attempt to make amnesty proceedings secret
was the fact that the people who had suffered would never really know who had ordered the violations in the
first place and how such things operated, whether in a systematic or haphazard way.").
126. Id.
127. See CHRISTIE, supra note 20, at 84-85. ("The various NGOs and organizations were quick to
react to [the possibility of a secrecy clause] and in a press statement endorsed by 30 of them argued that
secrecy was contrary to the Bill of Rights and violated the rights of victims and survivors of the apartheid
regime, including the right to information and fair administrative proceedings.").
128. Id. at 85.
129. See id. ("How would commissioners be appointed? What kinds of qualities would a
commissioner require? What measures should be taken now?.").
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between the president and the cabinet to pick the members. 30  However, the
process by which the commissioners would be chosen remained unclear: while
the political entities involved in the negotiations sought to preserve democratic
participation in choosing members, the Non-governmental Organizations
(NGOs) (again exerting their influence) maintained that commissioners should
not be subject to a political appointments process, but rather, selected through
an evaluation of their personal qualities.'
3
'
Finally, the passage of the Truth and Reconciliation Act also required
navigating the problematic political waters of what constituted a "political"
crime for the purposes of the legislation.' Several criteria were proposed to
determine what might constitute a political crime: the "gravity" of the offense,
whether a "reasonable and proportional relationship" existed between an indivi-
dual's political objective and means used to attain that objective; and whether
the act was directed against the government, political opponents, or private
individuals. 3 3 The criteria were adopted from a list of principles compiled by
Carl Norgaard, then President of the European Commission on Human Rights,
who had researched the application of the political offense exception in
extradition law.' 34  However, the NP rejected these criteria, arguing that the
ANC were not subject to the same criteria, and that the principles, as applied,
would amount to a witch hunt on the part of the ANC. 5 These differences of
opinion resulted in political deadlock between the two parties, 136 and a com-
promise was not reached until the NP conceded to a contextual understanding
of the Norgaard principles. These principles were codified into section 20 of the
Truth and Reconciliation Act.'
130. Id.
131. See id. at 86 (The qualities suggested in deciding who should be a commissioner included: an
ability to make impartial judgments; moral integrity accompanied by a known commitment to human, rights,
reconciliation, and disclosure of truth; no high profile political involvement or affiliation; not a potential
applicant for amnesty within the bounds of the legislation.).
132. CHRISTIE, supra note 20, at 86.
133. Id. at 87.
134. Bhargava, supra note 105, at 1312.
135. CHRISTIE, supra note 20, at 87-88.
136. Id. at 88.
137. As codified, the Act suggests that the Committee consider the following principles in
determining whether an act was a political crime:
[T]he motive of the person who committed the act; the context in which the act took
place; the legal and factual nature of the act, including the gravity of the act; the object
or objective of the act, and in particular whether the act was primarily directed at a
political opponent or against private property or individuals; whether the act was
committed in the execution of an order of, or on behalf of, or with the approval of a
political organization or the state; the relationship between the act and the political
objective pursued, and in particular the directness and proximity of the relationship and
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After years of apartheid-related human rights abuses, and drawing from the
postamble drafted at the culmination of years of negotiation, the South African
Parliament enacted the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34
(or the Truth and Reconciliation Act) on July 19, 1995.13' According to its
stated objectives, the TRC would investigate the human rights abuses occurring
within a determined period after March 1, 1960, grant amnesty to those who
would "make full disclosure" within the given period, afford victims an oppor-
tunity to narrate the violations they suffered, and facilitate nation-wide healing
and reconciliation.' 9 As established, the TRC did not exist as a judicial body-
it possessed no power to punish or determine any form of liability, and indeed
could provide amnesty to those who might make full disclosure of such acts, if
those acts could be related to political objectives."4 The quasi-legal body was
composed of sixteen members, with Desmond Tutu, the Anglican Archbishop
of Cape Town, serving as chair. 4 ' Three committees established by the TRC
assess, respectively, human rights violations, reparations and possible rehabili-
tation, and justice.'42 Moreover, by its own legislative mandate, the TRC
committees only cover those "gross" violations of human rights which occurred
between March 1, 1960 (the Sharpeville massacre) and December 5, 1993 (the
date that the transitional government was established). With these elements, the
the proportionality of the act to the objective pursued.
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No. 34 of 1995, available at http://www.polity.org.za
[hereinafter Truth and Reconciliation Act]; see also Bhargava, supra note 105, at 1312 [hereinafter Truth and
Reconciliation Act].
138. Truth and Reconciliation Act, supra note 137.
139. Id. at 1. In relevant part, the Truth and Reconciliation Act states:
[The objectives of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission are to:] [P]rovide for the
investigation and establishment of as complete a picture as possible of the nature,
causes, and extent of gross violations of human rights committed during the period
from 1 March 1960 to the cut-off date contemplated in the Constitution, within or
outside the Republic, emanating from the conflicts of the past, and the fate or
whereabouts of the victims of such violations; the granting of amnesty to persons who
make full disclosure of all the relevant facts relating to acts associated with a political
objective committed in the course of the conflicts of the past during the said period;
affording victims an opportunity to relate the violations they suffered; the taking of
measures aimed at the granting of reparation to, and the rehabilitation and the
restoration of the human and civil dignity of, victims of violations of human rights;
reporting to the Nation about such violations and victims; the making of
recommendations aimed at the prevention of the commission of gross violations of
human rights....
Id. (emphasis added).




Truth and Reconciliation Act inaugurated the TRC after a process of negotiation
and political concession. From December 1995 until October 1998 (when a
3500-page final report was presented to President Nelson Mandela), the TRC
held hundreds of hearings, received the statements of 21,000 individuals, and
processed more than 7000 applications for amnesty.'43
B. Ideology
With Nelson Mandela at the helm, his new government, the Government
of National Unity (GNU) faced the daunting task of navigating the terrain of a
land that was defined largely by the ravages of apartheid policies.'" As
discussed above, although issues of national unity and reconciliation-which
have rightly captured the imagination of the global community-were crucial
to the vocabulary of the TRCs creation, the fundamental engine of the new
Constitution and the TRC was the political desire to ensure a peaceful transition
to democracy.'45 The driving factors in these negotiations were not simply truth
and reconciliation-both values were abstractions that, while derivative of a
peaceable negotiation's result, were subject to the political concessions
characteristic of the entire negotiation. However, today, a ten-year space has
allowed for a re-reading of the South African narrative. Few acknowledge that
the TRC was forged in the furnace of political dissention, and throughout its
hearings, was subject to internal and external controversy.'" Just as the focus
of the international community in the mid-1970s was on the particularities of
South Africa's oppressive apartheid regime, 4 7 today, the international focus is
on the semiotic weight of South Africa's TRC as a restorative justice success
story.'48 Significantly, there exists a "schism" between the response of South
143. Daly, supra note 5, at 122.
144. See Charles, supra note 23, at 82 ("The most pressing problem confronting the new government
was how to reconcile a country that had been tom apart for decades by apartheid.").
145. Id. at 82-83.
146. See Colleen Scott, Combating Myth and Building Reality, in LOOKING BACK REACHING
FORWARD: REFLECTIONS ON THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA 107, 108
(Charles Villa-Vicencio & Wilhelm Verwoerd eds., 2000) ("To say that the TRC was controversial would be
a radical understatement. Thanks to the transparency of the entire process, it even generated controversy
outside the countly. Several of the South African political parties declined to accept the TRC officially.").
147. See Jeremy Rabkin, The Politics of the Geneva Convention: Disturbing Background to the ICC
Debate, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 169, 196 (2003) ("South Africa's apartheid system probably exhibited the most
systematic policy of racial discrimination practiced by any state in the world at the time and was roundly
denounced by almost every other state. It provoked particular fury among the newly independent states,
which, by the mid-1970s, constituted, the majority of the General Assembly.").
148. See, e.g., Frangois Du Bois, "Nothing but the Truth": the South African Alternative to
Corrective Justice in Transitions to Democracy, in LETHE'S LAW: JUSTICE, LAW AND ETHICS IN
RECONCIIATION91 (Emilios Christodoulidis & Scott Veitch eds., 2001) ("[Jlustas the architects of the South
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Africans and non-South Africans to the TRC-while the TRC enjoys an
exceedingly high international reputation, many South Africans themselves
remain "skeptical" of it benefits.'49 Describing the development of this
metanarrative early in the TRCs development, journalist Antjie Krog wrote, "It
is clear that the commission has taken on a moral life of its own and is willing
to oppose even the party that gave it birth."' 5° Ironically, a process geared
toward the cathartic reconstruction of a legitimate narrative and "exposing
reality"'51 can itself become subject to historical re-reading and revision.
The TRC's semiotic weight derives largely from its development within
intersecting spheres of politics and ideology. At the outset of the resistance
movement in South Africa, political and ideological goals existed in a functional
marriage. As Jakes Gerwel, former Director-General in the Office of the State
President describes: "[n]ational reconciliation was.. . concurrently imbedded
in the anti-apartheid and democratic struggle."'52  What makes productive
analysis of the TRC difficult is the conflation of political goals or concessions
(in the push toward a democratic state) with ideological guideposts (such as
national reconciliation). Therefore, a critique of the TRC as a developing
metanarrative needs to engage in some conceptual severance in order to parse
out the reasons for its constructed mythology.
In many ways, the reasons behind the formation of the TRC as a dominant
ideological metanarrative flow from its own legislative mandate to focus on
those gross violations of human rights that characterized decades of injustice
and oppression.'53 As a result of the limited range of actions implicated within
the terms of the TRC, those "gross violations" became representative of the
apartheid years.' Naturally, with the focus on such egregious acts, the TRC
was translated, for the global community, from a primarily political narrative
African strategy drew on experiences elsewhere, others have looked expectantly towards South Africa for a
precedent on dealing with past injustice in the transition to democracy.").
149. Daly, supra note 5, at 156. Daly observes further that outsiders may have the "luxury" of
focusing on the TRC's promise (rather than its shortcomings) because "they do not live with the problems of
quotidian life in South Africa and can think about how the lessons learned in South Africa can be used in other
parts of the world." Id. at 158.
150. Shriver, supra note 14, at 13 (citation omitted).
151. See Scott, supra note 146, at 11I ("The South African TRC was-and is-about peeling away
deceit and exposing reality.").
152. Jakes Gerwel, National Reconciliation: Holy Grail or Secular Pact?, in LOOKING BACK
REACHING FORWARD: REFLECTiONS ON THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOuTH AFRICA
277 (Charles Villa-Vicencio & Wilhelm Verwoerd eds., 2000).
153. Id. at 279.
154. See id. ("These limited categories of human rights violations, subsequently heard and publicized




into a primarily ideological narrative.' The overall result of this new
metanarrative has been a conceptual shift, one which invited a move away from
the "statist" perception of the apartheid regime and the ensuing negotiation
process to "a more human substantive understanding based in social history and
biography."'156 Through public hearings that became the site for oral histories,
the TRC sidestepped its laborious birthright in the political negotiations process
and acquired a literary legacy and force.' The overall result was a Com-
mission that took on mythological proportions by adopting a universally-
applicable vocabulary for discourse. 5
Politically, the individuals who were involved in the TRCs development
amplified its construction as an ideological formula rather than its original
position as a "primarily formal measure in [the] overall political settlement."' 9
In particular, with Bishop Desmond Tutu' 60 and Dr. Alex Boraine 6' at the helm,
the Commission was naturally overlaid with vocabulary that traversed the
sacred and secular. 62 The ethos of forgiveness captured by the TRC fueled a
view of the Commission as having an almost scriptural intonation. 6' The public
155. See id. ("The pure horror of those narratives of suffering, degradation and the personal tragedy,
of human beings caught up and involved as victims and perpetrators, could not but have focused the national
attention and awareness on the deeply personal and emotional levels at which people in this society, given its
history, should (also) reconcile with each other and with themselves for their part in structured brutality.").
156. Id.
157. See Gerwel, supra note 152, at 280 ("It is in the construction of such a lineage of narratives of
national remembrance that the TRC may be found to have made its most lasting contribution. As an event
of story-telling, confession and forgiving, within a quasi-judicial framework, it represented a unique moment
in the country's history-an interstitial pause for a nation to acknowledge its unity and intimate inter-
connections also in perversity and suffering.").
158. See Teitel, supra note 1, at 83 ("Conflating public and private choices [in the restorative justice
model] signaled the breakdown and interconnection of the private and public spheres, a phenomenon
associated with globalization. The perceived democratic deficit has led to the pursuit of a universalizing and
legitimizing discourse.").
159. Gerwel supra note 152, at 280.
160. See Paul Lansing & Julie C. King, South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission: The
Conflict Between Individual Justice and National Healing in the Post-Apartheid Age, 15 Ariz. J. Int'l &
Comp. L. 753, 785 (1998) (noting that the choice of Tutu as chairperson of the TRC has been subject to
criticisms that the TRC was dominated by "an element of clericalism").
161. Richard John Galvin, The Case for a Japanese Truth Commission Covering World War It Era
Japanese War Crimes, II TUL. J. INT'L & CoM. L. 59, 96 n.292 (2003) (At the time of his appointment as
Deputy Chairperson of the TRC, Dr. Boraine was a prominent '"former church leader."').
162. See Nancy J. Holland, "Truth as Force": Michel Foucault on Religion, State Power, and the
Law, 18 J.L. & RELIGION 79, 92 (2002) ("The reconciliation at issue [in South Africa's Truth and
Reconciliation Commission] remains... ambivalent between a socio-political rite of, if not forgiveness, at
least reintegration into the social fabric of the society, and religious salvation.").
163. See Eisnaugle, supra note 5, at 229 ("The TRC best exemplifies how an international truth
commission focused on the theological goals of restorative justice would look and function.").
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hearings, in particular, re-framed the TRC as less an agent for political transition
and rather, an agent for spiritual rehabilitation. For those involved, Tutu's
leadership informed the tenor of the proceedings: "[Tutu] wept with the victims
and marked every moment of repentance and forgiveness with awe. Where a
jurist would have been logical, [Tutu did not hesitate] to be theological. He
sensed when to lead audience members in a hymn to help a victim recover
composure and when to call them all to prayer."'' Ultimately, the spiritual
vocabulary engaged by the TRC leadership helped amplify the TRCs
development into the restorative justice narrative. As a result, contemporary
elements of TRCs in different countries are instinctively associated with a
theological discourse.' 65
Moreover, economically, these are beneficial times for transitioning states
to be utilizing restorative justice ideologies. As a result of the popularity of the
TRC metanarrative in the global community, nations in transition may become
more influenced to pursue a restorative justice model since "they rely
disproportionately on international legitimacy and material aid."' 6 6 The effect
of these subtle economic pressures is not only a more categorical acceptance of
truth commissions, but also the perpetuation of a mythology which, as discussed
infra, may be ill-suited to meets its professed goals.
IV. SOUTH AFRICA TODAY-WHEN CONFESSION PROVES INSUFFICIENT
Since the metanarrative of the TRC turns largely on the presumption that
cathartic truth-telling and forgiveness could repair a nation broken by apartheid,
a productive critique of South Africa's TRC must also examine the effectiveness
of this model of restorative justice. Has the TRC made strides in the national
reconciliation it sought to inaugurate? This section of the article suggests that
the culture of confession modeled in the TRC and dominating contemporary
discourse concerning restorative justice is more cathartic' 67 than constructive.
The contemporary culture of restorative justice, and of current truth
commission models, is forward-looking, focusing on the future possibilities of
164. Id. at 230 (quoting Peter Storey, A Different Kind ofJustice: Truth and Reconciliation in South
Africa, NEW WORLD OUTLOOK, July/Aug. 1999, at 17).
165. See, e.g., Nahal Kazemi, Prospects for Justice and Reconciliation in Sierra Leone, 44 Harv. Int'l
L.J. 287, 293 (2003) ("Churches in Sierra Leone played a significant role in the peace negotiations through
the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone, so the choice of a religious leader for the commissioner may
resonate with the country.").
166. Daly, supra note 5, at 111-112.
167. See Margaret M. Russell, Cleansing Moments and Retrospective Justice, 101 MICH. L. REV.
1225, 1265 (2003) ("Critical to the investigatory function of the TRC was the catharsis of personal storytelling
by survivors, witnesses, and wrongdoers. According to Archbishop Tutu and others, storytelling as the




forgiveness and reconciliation. In discussing the development of restorative
justice, Ruti Teitel notes: "[florgiveness became a distinctive form of political
apology, understood as an act of contrition in a realm of unity politics.' ' 68
Suddenly, personal rehabilitation is replete with political significance. 69  The
outstanding question, however, is to what degree confession and truth-telling are
effectively therapeutic measures.
If a proper critique of the Truth and Reconciliation is to develop, a
fundamental premise must be challenged: is this new, forcible re-encountering
of the past 7 ' a productive therapy? Although contemporary scholarship
concerning the TRC may assume otherwise,' 7' as a matter of "intellectual
historiography and human self-understanding," the notion of revisiting the past
in order to move forward is a value that is "under siege."' 72 Restorative justice
models are nominally attached to the legal sphere, yet truth commissions may
now engage a more metaphysical process.'73 The question of whether past-
orientation can be a successful means of nation-(re)building is critical today, for
six years after the final report of the TRC, many South Africans continue to
wonder "why the end of the rainbow seems so dull."'74
While the TRC established an express goal of promoting national recon-
ciliation, the process of individual applications created a confusing interface
between politics and ethics: while the limited number of cases seen by the TRC
naturally took on symbolic force in moral terms, the screening process was
defined by a legal definition of those acts which could claim a political
168. Teitel, supra note 1, at 84.
169. See Daly, supra note 5, at 86 ("In the TRC's understanding, reconciliation, through individually
experienced, has national ramifications.").
170. See Scott Veitch, The Legal Politics of Amnesty, in LETHE'S LAW: JUSTICE, LAW AND ETHICS
IN REcoNCIIATION 33, 36 (Emilios Christodoulidis & Scott Veitch eds., 2001) ("[L]aw is conventionally
future-oriented [and] retrospectively is shunned [because] law's normativity is bound up with the possibility
of obeying or disobeying its commands.").
171. See, e.g., Daly, supra note 5, at 132-33("The families of those unlawfully tortured, maimed or
traumatized become more empowered to discover the truth, the perpetrators become exposed to opportunities
to obtain relief from the burden of a guilt or an anxiety they might be living with for many long years, the
country begins the long and necessary process of healing the wounds of the past, transforming anger and grief
into a mature understanding and creating the emotional and structural climate essential for [reconciliation].").
172. Teitel, supra note 1, at 86.
173. See id. at 87 ("The question remains whether there are any transitional justice baselines or any
threshold minimum beyond which historical, psychological, or religious inquiry ought to be characterized as
justice-seeking... The relevant inquiry is not a metaphysical enterprise, but rather must be understood in its
historical and political context.") (emphasis added); but see Daly, supra note 5, at 134 ("While justice and
healing are not synonymous, there is a certain commonality in the sense that both are concerned with
achieving a balance, within the body or the body politic.").
174. Daly, supra note 5, at 156-57 (observing that some South Africans themselves believe the TRC
to have produced "division and pain and very high but unfulfilled expectations of closure and healing").
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objective. The amnesty process developed according to an individual-by-
individual mechanism; for example, when thirty-seven ANC members sought
amnesty for human rights violations on which they did not elaborate, that
"blanket" amnesty was categorically denied.' However, the individualization
that characterizes the amnesty process has counterintuitive results. While the
individual narrative gains a certain moral force, particularly in light of hearings
which stressed the quasi-religious parables of oral histories, the overt language
of the hearings maintains an (arguably artificial) distinction between the legal
and ethical spheres by focusing on the language of actions "associated with a
political objective."' 76 Although the TRC panel ultimately considers the ways
in which expression of "moral aspects" as a component of the "process of
reconciliation in its broader context," the panel refuses to confer a judgment
based on the "moral appropriateness" of an action in its prior context.' The
argument of this article is that the TRCs legacy has been confused as a result of
two conflated contexts: the moral and legal spheres. The national reconciliation
for which the TRC was tailored cannot exist merely on symbolic or moral
grounds, which is the force of the TRCs legacy.
Confounding the TRCs pursuit of truth (as a necessary predecessor to
reconciliation)' 7 8-and thereby complicating the TRCs legacy--is the complex
interrelationship between truth and memory. In analyzing the amnesty process
instituted by the TRC, legal theorist Scott Veitch observes: "[T]ruth is not the
object to be uncovered in the contemporary hearings on amnesty, but rather
what is to be articulated is the truth of the manifestation of memory. Moreover,
this memory is not itself simply an object, since it is inseparable from the
performative process that recalls it as an event."'79 Effectively, the theoretical
complication of the TRC is that "truth," in all its assumed, capitalized grandeur,
is not necessarily an artifact of the past that can then be subject to forensic80
discovery. Rather, truth operates in tandem with an individual's disclosures,
and the process which constitutes memory is located in "no less than the
decision-making process of the amnesty panel."'' Ultimately, the process is
175. Veitch, supra note 170, at 38.
176. Id
177. Id.
178. See id. at 39 (observing that the TRC premised amnesty on the notion that truth was required
for reconciliation); see also Du Bois, supra note 148, at 92 ("'Reconciliation through truth"' was the lodestar
of the South African vision of transitional justice.") (quoting unnamed source).
179. Veitch, supra note 170, at 39 (emphasis original).
180. For a discussion of various definitions of "truth" examined by the TRC, see infra Part I1. My
use of the term "forensic" here is not intended to be conflated with a forensic concept of truth, which was
arguably dismissed by the TRC. See Du Bois, supra note 148, at 97-98 ("The TRC itself discounted the value
of the forensic' notion of truth.').
181. Veitch, supra note 170, at 39.
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problematic because the amnesty hearings are dependent on what is essentially
"not the truth of the event but of its accounting... [which] from the point of
view of adjudication [is] unknown and unknowable."'' 8 2 Since the TRC panel
already possessed a distinct view on the events of apartheid,' the practical
result of the TRCs emphasis on full disclosure is an inevitably political re-
evaluation of the past events.'
Perhaps most fundamentally, the TRC is problematic in its assumption that
confession and truth-telling will produce a psychological benefit of reconcilia-
tion and a social benefit of nation-building without the "settled" quality of a
judicial decision or the requisite repentance of a theological process.8 5 As
Frangois du Bois, law professor at the University of Cape Town, observes: "[t]o
engage in the search for understanding is therefore to express a commitment to
the possibility of meaning. Hence, before the search can begin, that possibility
must be established."'8 6 Simply put, can nation-building, reconciliation, and
justice be legitimate results of truth-telling when "truth" itself is flexible in
meaning? According to the Final Report from the TRC, four notions of truth
are implicated in the public hearings: "factual or forensic truth; personal or
narrative truth; social or 'dialogue' truth and healing and restorative truth."'87
However, the ethos of the hearings, and in particular, the emphasis on oral
confession as preceding reconciliation, suggest that the notion of "healing and
restorative truth" was the guiding principle of the Commission's work.'
182. Id. at 40.
183. See Du Bois, supra note 148, at 93-94 (noting that the question of how to approach the past
nearly derailed the initial transitional negotiations because it was a position of power to "control the past").
184. See Veitch, supra note 170, at 42 ("The explicit insertion of a conditional re-reading of the
events of the past requires a determinedly political assessment of the legal response."); Du Bois, supra note
148, at 107 ("[T]he TRC's truth was as conditioned by the network of power relationships that existed during
the transition as criminal trials would have been."). See Veitch, supra note 170, at 41 (noting that further
complications of political assessment of memory is inconsistency in application outcomes and that
inconsistency may result from judges who have naturally not been able to distance themselves from "assessing
qualitatively" the applications for amnesty).
185. See Du Bois, supra note 148, at 96 ("(There is an underlying] suspicion that the search for truth
does not provide a way out of the dilemma of having to choose between, and deal with the draw-backs of,
impunity-allowing the past to rule the future--and victor's justice-allowing the future to harness the past
to its own ends.").
186. Id. at 97.
187. Id. (quoting TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SoUTH AFRICA REPORT 110 (1998)).
188. See id. at 98. ("It is difficult to see how the TRC could have concluded [that any notion ofjustice
would take priority over 'healing truth.'] ... It was meant to be neither a court nor a promoter of impunity.
Its task was not to establish guilt, but to establish responsibility. Since it could not judge or punish, it had to
diagnose and heal.").
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Another difficulty with conditional amnesty which focuses simply on "full
disclosure"1 89 of some politically-associated act is the divergence between
confession and repentance. Is repentance, and not merely confession, what is
required of a truly forward-looking attempt at reconciliation? In the dialectical
tension that exists between secular law and ethics, it often appears that
"repentance belongs to another world, to another universe of discourse. '' 190
Aeyal M. Gross, law professor at Tel Aviv University, emphasizes that legal
discourse can indeed bear sociologically relevant fruit: "[d]uring transitions, the
law plays a pivotal role in shaping social memory through trials, investigations,
and TRCs. The preservation of a historical narrative during transitions is crucial
for addressing past events that have not been talked about, as well as for
informing the evolution of a more democratic society."' 91 However, the shaping
of a society's collective memory and the development of a coherent historical
narrative may not effect nation-wide reconciliation. 9 Problematically, these
notions of reconciliation and a truthful social memory are often conflated in
scholarly analysis.'93  For Gross, to "some small degree," repentance was
indeed a part of the TRC process, but "only under certain conditions and as part
of the forgiveness-repentance exchange."'" However, other studies have
suggested that indeed, truth may not lead naturally to either repentance or
reconciliation. 95 Capturing this perspective is the widow of resistance leader
Steve Biko, tortured to death by South African police during the apartheid
regime. Although ultimately unsuccessful, Biko's widow joined other indivi-
duals and organizations in petitioning that the statute establishing the TRC (and
its conditional amnesty) be declared unconstitutional. 96
Ironically, the TRCs emphasis on "healing and restorative truth" may have
subverted its own pursuit of nation-building and reconciliation. Reconciliation
in the abstract requires a communion of equal (as opposed to politically
imbalanced) adversaries: reconciliation thus argues for "the creation of some
189. See Aeyal M. Gross, The Constitution, Reconciliation, and Transitional Justice: Lessons from
South Africa and Israel, 40 STAN,. J  INT'L L. 47, 69 (2004) ("'he South African process required publicly
acknowledging the past and exposing the offences of the apartheid regime.").
190. Id. at 47 (quoting J. M. COETZEE, DISGRACE 58 (1999)).
191. Gross, supra note 189, at 68 (emphasis added).
192. See id. ("[D]ealing with the past extends beyond the sphere of criminal responsibility and
personal impunity, encompassing larger questions that countries must address in times of transition.").
193. See id. at 68-69 (suggesting that the desire for "[n]ational [u]nity and (r]econciliation" is
conceptually equivalent to the mission of "fashion[ing] a new consensual memory of the past as one of
injustice").
194. Gross, supra note 189, at 72.
195. See generally PRISCILLA HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: FACING THE CHALLENGE OF TRUTH
CoMaissIoNs (2002).
196. Gross, supra note 189, at 75.
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commonality, the transcending of at least some differences."197 However, the
TRCs extension of conditional amnesty changed the rhetoric of the political
dialogue from that of "perpetrators and victims" to an amorphous group of
"confessors" of oral histories.'98 The TRC thereby struggled with competing
desires for a "healing truth" (which diminishes the distinctions between victim
and perpetrator) on the one hand and reconciliation (which presumes a
distinction between victim and perpetrator) on the other. As a result, the
Commission may have been fighting a losing battle in its attempt to inaugurate
lasting reconciliation. After the Final Report of the Commission was released,
the Report was subject to criticism by South Africans on either side, both of
which argued that the "truth" which the TRC was meant to unveil did not
emerge.'" Ultimately, the TRCs legacy is problematic: in its own Report, there
is a frank acknowledgment that "everyone who came before the Commission
did not experience healing and reconciliation."2°" Although certainly, the TRC
should not be held to unrealistic goals, this article has argued that its
fundamental premises were flawed, and therefore, substantiates a critique of the
metanarrative of this restorative justice model that now dominates the
international community.
V. CASE STUDY: RWANDA
A. Background on the Rwandan Genocide of 1994
While officials in South Africa sought to develop a tenable foundation for
the TRC, in central Africa, the country of Rwanda became the backdrop for
genocide of global proportions. Before one hundred days would pass, the
Rwanda of 1994 would be the stage for anachronistically primitive carnage.
The Rwandan genocide of 1994 was singular in several respects: "the number
and concentration of deaths, the intensity of the killing, the extensive use of rape
as a form of ethnic violence, and the massive involvement of the Rwandan
population. 20' Although controversy surrounds every attempt at explaining the
197. Du Bois, supra note 148, at 103.
198. See id. ("[T]he truth required for reconciliation is one that restores to victims the dignity needed
to face perpetrators as equals, and accordingly, as the TRC realized, acknowledges victims as victims. This,
however, implies that the distinction between victims and perpetrators be kept alive, emphasized even.");
Gross, supra note 189, at 70 (noting that the conditional amnesty conferred by the TRC "risked creating
symmetry between the perpetrators of apartheid and its victims").
199. See Du Bois, supra note 148, at 113 ( Although the criticism of the Report from different sides
in the apartheid struggle might tempt one to the satisfying conclusion that the TRC was impartial, it is vital
to note that the common ground established by the symmetry of these reactions lies in a shared rejection of
the TRC's truth.").
200. Id. at 12.
201. Erin Daly, Between Punitive and Reconstructive Justice: The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, 34
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triggers of the genocide, 2 all scholars concede that in the period from April 7
to July 17, 1994, between 500,000 and 1,000,000 Rwandans2°3 were killed by
hundreds of thousands of their fellow Rwandans."6 Systematic in its progress
205
and brutally primitive 21 in its realization, the stark efficiency of the genocide
drew comparisons with the Holocaust. °7 In sum, approximately ten percent of
the Rwandan national population died within the span of one hundred days.2"5
Although precise reasons for the events of 1994 are difficult to delineate,
any productive analysis of the genocide must consider the importance of
ethnicity in Rwanda, and particularly, what some have argued as the long-
standing rivalry between the majority Hutus and the minority Tutsis. 20 9
N.Y.U. J INT'L L. & POL. 355 (2002) [hereinafter Daly I]. As Daly notes, in the 100 days of the Rwandan
genocide in 1994, the approximated figure of one million Rwandans killed by hand corresponds to the death
toll in Washington, D.C. and New York on September 11, 2001, if those deaths occurred every single day for
3 months. Id. at355 n.1.
202. See id. at 358 ("Among the disputed issues are the numbers of people who killed and who were
killed; the extent of Hutu and Tutsi animosity before the genocide;... the role of European colonizers and
the Catholic Church in fomenting racial distrust; ... the role of the international community... ; and the
extent to which the genocide could have been prevented.").
203. Although most approximations of those killed during the 1994 genocide fall within this
(admittedly generous) range, the precise figure remains controversial. See, e.g., PHILiP GOUREVITCH, WE
WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROw WE WILL BE KILLED WTrH OUR FAMiiIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA
4 (1999) ("[A]t least eight hundred thousand people were killed in just a hundred days. Rwandans often speak
of a million deaths, and they maybe right."); Dmumbl, supra note i1, at 1222 ("[A]n estimated 800,000 people
were murdered in an attempt to wipe out the Tutsi inhabitants of Rwanda."); Maureen Laflin, Gacaca Courts:
The Hope for Reconciliation in the Aftermath of the Rwandan Genocide, 46 ADVOC. (IDAHO) 19 (2003)
("Over a span of just one hundred days in 1994, upwards of 1,000,000 people died in the genocide in
Rwanda.").
204. Daly IL supra note 201, at 361.
205. See Drumbl, supra note 11, at 1245 ("The Rwandan genocide was organized by the Rwandan
government, supported by local authorities, and undertaken by ordinary Rwandan men and women. The
violence did not arise out of anarchic chaos. Nor did it emerge from a general breakdown of norms governing
group and individual behavior.").
206. See id. at 1245-46 ("These killings were not depersonalized through physical distance or the
use of technology. Victims were butchered with machetes (pangs), sticks, tools, and large clubs studded with
nails (masu).").
207. See GOUREVITCH, supra note 203 ("[Tlhe dead of Rwanda accumulated at nearly three times
the rate of Jewish dead during the Holocaust. It was the most efficient mass killing since the atomic bombings
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.").
208. Drumbl, supra note 11, at 1223.
209. See Christina M. Carroll, An Assessment of the Role and Effectiveness of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Rwandan National Justice System Dealing with the Mass Atrocities
of 1994, 18 B.U. INT'L L.J. 163, 166 (2000) ("Since pre-colonial times, an ethnic, social, political, and
economic rivalry has existed between the Hutus and the Tutsis in central Africa."); but see Drumbl, supra note
11, at 1242-43 ("From an historical and anthropological perspective, ethnic cleavages in Rwanda are less
pronounced than in other regions where genocidal violence has taken hold ... Historically, both groups were
2005]
Certainly, the vocabulary of ethnic classification existed during Rwanda's
colonial era, when both Belgian and European colonizers placed an administra-
tive premium on acknowledging group identities. 20 Among the controversies
surrounding the Rwandan genocide, however, is the extent to which ethnic
classification is a proper contextual frame. 21n  Regardless, whether conflict
between the Hutus and the Tutsi was a well-entrenched historical reality prior
to the latter decades of the twentieth century,2t 2 few contest that ethnic conflicts
reached a head after Hutu Juvenal Habyarimana seized the presidency in a 1973
coup d'etat.213 In particular, tensions increased during the latter years of
Habyarimana's presidency, when Rwandan government forces engaged in
sporadic armed conflict with the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the army of
Tutsi refugees and expatriates.2 4 These tensions peaked into the one hundred
day genocide after Habyarimana's death in a plane crash on April 6, 1994.15
The ethnic discourse underlying the Rwandan genocide develops from a widely-
acknowledged belief that "the propaganda of the Habyarimana government and
its genocidal successor induced many Hutu to believe that the [minority] Tutsi
were about to attack them," and therefore, to engage in genocide was actually
a "preemptive strike. 21 6 It is uncontested that in the years prior to the genocide,
socially fluid, with intrasocietal divisions operating more along clan (ubwoko) lines than 'ethnic' lines.").
210. See Carroll, supra note 209, at 167 ("For administrative purposes, the Belgian colonial rulers
established a system of national identification cards with the ethnic classifications: Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa. The
European colonizers accentuate ethnic differences and solidified group identities through this categorization
... Additionally, ethnicity is recorded on Rwandan's identity cards and in the census.").
211. Daly, supra note 201, at 359.
212. Heated debate currently surrounds the question of whether there was historical animosity
between the Hutus and the Tutsis. See Carroll, supra note 209, at 167 ("Hutus may have been resentful of the
favoritism Europeans showed the Tutsis during colonial times. From the early 1960s, when the Hutus gained
power, to the 1990s, ethnic violence erupted periodically. Massacres occurred in 1959, 1963, 1966, and
1973."). But see GOUREVrrCH, supra note 203, at 59 (noting that until 1959, there had "never been systematic
political violence recorded between Hutus and Tutsis--anywhere).
213. See Carroll, supra note 209, at 167-78.
214. Laflin, supra note 203, at 19; see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, GACACA: AQuEsTIONOFJUSTICE
3 (2002), available at http://web.amnesty.orglibrary/index/ENGAFR470072002 (last visited Mar. 23, 2004)
[hereinafter QUESTION OF JUSTICE] ("[The one hundred days of genocide] occurred within the context of an
on going, albeit intermittent, armed conflict (October 1990 to July 1994) between the RPF and Rwandese
government forces ... Following the RPF invasion, and preceding the killings that occurred between April
and July 1994, local authorities-with government connivance-launched 17 large-scale attacks against Tutsi
in 12 communities, killing an estimated 2,000 individuals.").
215. Extremists among the Hutu accused the RPF of assassinating President Habyarimana. U.S.
INSTITUTE OF PEACE, RWANDA: ACCOUNTABILITY FOR WAR CRIMEs AND GENOCIDE (1995), available at
http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/early/rwandalhtml (last visited Mar. 21, 2004) (hereinafter
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR WAR CRIMES).
216. Drumbl, supra note 11, at 1243.
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any collective identity that once may have existed in Rwanda was dissipated,
and a "ferocious acrimony" existed between the Hutu and the Tutsi.217
During the one hundred days of the Rwandan genocide, among the most
significant characteristics of the tragedy were the systematic manner of the
slaughter and the wide-spread contribution to its progress. Not only did
hundreds of thousands of Rwandans contribute to the deaths of Hutu opposi-
tionists and Tutsis, ls systematic encouragement from radio messages and
leaders from every social tier2 9 helped incite what was effectively a "populist
genocide."22 In a Special Report on Rwanda, the United States Institute of
Peace notes that typically, when countries experience violations of human rights
on the scale of Rwanda, that violence is most often sponsored by military and
political organizations, while "the rest of society [is free] to go about its
business with relatively clean hands.,, 22 1 However, by contrast, the Rwanda
genocide featured a "deliberate attempt to force public participation on as broad
a basis as possible, co-opting everyone... [and] inciting civilians to participate
in the massacre. '222 In a UN study following the genocide, a Special Rapporteur
to the UN Commission on Human Rights found the genocide to be "concerted,
planned, and systematic," citing: the government use of radio broadcasts to
incite ethnic dissension and violence, government distribution of arms to the
militias and civilians, the discovery of lists naming those to be executed, and the
speed with which the massacres were initiated after the April plane crash.2 23 As
a result, the reach of the genocide extended across every social line and every
vocational barrier.24 Although there was no forced recruitment into the militia,
young Rwandan males flocked into the ranks, creating what would become
500,000 active militia members.225 While armed forces and local police
engaged in the violence, professionals such as physicians and teachers were
often equally enthusiastic participants.226 Indeed, teachers figured prominently
217. Id. at 1244.
218. Daly, supra note 201, at 361-62; see Pernille Ironside, Rwandan Gacaca: Seeking Alternative
Means to Justice, Peace and Reconciliation, 15 N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 31 (2002) ("The high level of public
participation and complicity in the killings, attacks, rapes and pillages, is particularly disturbing. The
slaughter often took place in broad daylight within the perpetrators' local communities and was committed
against neighbors, friends and even family members.").
219. GOUREVITCH, supra note 203, at 115.
220. Daly, supra note 201, at 361.
221. AccouNTABILiTY IN WAR CRIMES, supra note 215.
222. Id.
223. Carroll, supra note 209, at 170.
224. See Daly, supra note 5, at 162 ("Most were murdered not by professional military personnel,
but by fellow citizens, neighbors, friends, teachers, priests, and even family members.").




in the genocide, with schools forming the backdrop for scenes in which Hutu
teachers would denounce Tutsi pupils to the militia or even murder their own
students.227 The Rwandan genocide, therefore, is a study in paradox: while the
scope of public participation might suggest a spontaneous and fierce combustion
of intra- and inter-tribal tensions, the execution of the campaign was the result
of measured, deliberate, individual and corporate choices.
Despite the hundreds of thousands of Tutsi deaths, the Tutsi-populated
Rwandan Patriotic Front seized control on July 18, 1994 and the fledgling
government began the process of repairing a nation fundamentally changed.28
In just three months of intense conflict, only 40,000 to 50,000 men and women
remained of the 350,000 inhabitants in the capitol city of Kigali.229 Without
running water, electricity, or a functioning government infrastructure, the
capitol was a shadow of its former self and emblematic of the systemic
problems occurring in the rest of the country as well.230 In fact, in the wake of
the genocide's ravages, the World Bank declared Rwanda the poorest nation on
earth.231 In a Special Report, the Organization for African Unity describes the
crippled state of Rwanda post-genocide: "Nothing functioned. There was a
country but no state. There was no money; the genocidaires had run off with
whatever cash reserves existed... There were no organs of government, either
centrally or locally. There was no justice system to enforce laws or to offer
protection to the citizenry., 232 The new government, therefore, faced a daunting
task: the rebuilding of a national infrastructure and the reconciliation of inhabi-
tants whose mutual history was characterized by distrust and political upheaval.
B. Development of the Gacaca Courts
While South Africa moved toward restorative justice through its TRC,
Rwanda chose to take a more punitive route, through three separate forums, two
more traditionally punitive and one seeking a middle-ground of sorts: the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (the ICTR), the domestic criminal
justice system, and the Gacaca courts.233 Significantly, a retributive justice
227. Id.
228. ACCOUNTABILrrY FOR WAR CRMES, supra note 215.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. GOUREVITcH, supra note 203, at 270 (observing that in the wake of the genocide, 95 percent of
Rwandans lived on an average income of 16 cents per day, or 60 dollars per year).
232. Daly, supra note 201, at 366. (citation omitted).
233. Laflin, supra note 203, at 20. The United Nations established the ICTR through Resolution 995
in November 1994, but the first trial did not occur until 1997. Rosilyn M. Borland, The Gacaca Tribunals and
Rwanda after Genocide: Effective Restorative Community Justice or Further Abuse of Human Rights I (Fall
2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at
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model was then applauded by other countries: "With the support of most of the
international community, including Amnesty International, the Rwandese
government opted for extensive prosecution, arguing that it wanted to end the
impunity that characterized Rwandese political culture. Justice, the new
government deemed, was the necessary and indispensable premise to national
reconciliation. 234 However, these measures have proven far from successful-
despite promises to ensure "individual criminal accountability" for perpetrators,
the ICTR had brought only a little over a dozen cases to judgment as of 2003,23s
the consistently weak judicial system in Rwanda2 36 suffered from severe backlog
in its case dockets,2 37 and despite much discussion over the Gacaca courts in the
last five years, the Gacaca system has yet to progress in implementation beyond
a few pilot projects.235 Moreover, the judicial crisis leaves Rwanda in dire
http://www.american.edu/academic.depts/sis/sword/CurrntIssue/essayl.pdf. (last visited Oct. 06, 2005)
234. QUESTION OF JUSTICE, supra note 214, at 4.
235. See Borland, supra note 233, at I ("While the ICTR has made important strides for international
humanitarian law, including the first conviction of rape as a war crime, in general it has not met the needs of
the Rwandan people."); Victoria Brittain, Letter from Rwanda, THE NATION, Sept. 1, 2003, available at
http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20030901&s=brittain ("The United Nations Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, which sits in Arusha in neighboring Tanzania, is trying major genocide suspects but has been
plagued by internal bickering and inefficiency. It has completed only fifteen cases, and acknowledges that
it will be unable to complete the trials of the forty-nine suspects now under arrest before it ends in 2008.");
Ironside, supra note 218, at 32 ("The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ... secured fewer than nine
convictions in five-and-a-half years of operation, despite an annual budget of approximately $80 million [in
U.S. currency] and over 800 staff members.').
236. See Borland, supra note 233, at I ("Rwanda's legal system was basically destroyed during the
genocide; of approximately 785 judges practicing before the genocide, only 20 survived."); Laflin, supra note
203, at 20 ('The pre-genocide judicial system in Rwanda was extremely weak, suffering from limited
resources, insufficiently trained personnel, and a lack of judicial independence. The genocide totally
destroyed it. For over two years following the genocide the country was without a functioning legal system.
Not until the latter part of 1886 did the Rwandan judiciary become operational once again.").
237. See Borland, supra note 233 ("Within Rwanda, only about 5,000 of the more than 100,000jailed
as genocide suspects have been tried."); Brittain, supra note 235 ("The broken judiciary, rebuilt at record
speed, has begun trials, but it could never complete anywhere near 100,000 in this generation."); Ironside,
supra note 218, at 32 ("While the domestic genocide trials have made greater progress with its dockets, having
cleared an estimated 5,000 cases since 1996 ... [,] even if this pace were maintained, it would still take
upwards of 120 years to prosecute the estimated 110,000 to 130,000 alleged genocidaires who continue to be
held in overcrowded prisons and community lock-up cells throughout the country."); Laflin, supra note 203,
at 20 ("By the end of 2001, the country's domestic criminal justice system had conducted approximately five
thousand genocide-related trials, leaving approximately 125,000 suspects in jails or prisons designed to
accommodate only 15,000. It has been estimated that using the conventional court system would take over
two hundred years to try the cases of those already incarcerated for crimes related to the genocide. There are
simply not enough judges, prosecutors, and lawyers.").
238. See Laflin, supra note 203, at 21 ("Contemporary Gacaca courts are still in their infancy. In
June 2002, the country started a four-month pilot project with eighty courts. By December 2002, some 600
courts had opened. The goal is to have an estimated 10,000 courts in operation.").
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economic straits as well: "while the expense of feeding the detainees has been
shared thus far with the international community; donors have indicated that
Rwanda will have to bear an increasing amount of this burden in the future,
which it cannot afford." '239 Naturally, this economic pressure translates into the
politics of Rwanda's nation-building: like South Africa in the early stages of its
transition period, Rwanda's transition necessarily takes place under the watchful
eye of the international community.
Of the three proposed solutions, the Gacaca courts are distinct from the
ICTR and the traditional criminal justice system-an alternative dispute
resolution mechanism, the Gacaca courts were first mentioned in 1998 after it
became increasingly clear that the other means of judicial resolution were
insufficient to try the over 100,000 detainees suspected of having participated
in the genocide. 2' The Gacaca system soon became a much-lauded, non-
conventional option, in similar fashion to the way in which the TRC became the
cinderella story of restorative justice for the international community.24' This
reaction is in contradistinction to the wariness of some Rwandan people. As
Anastase Nabahire, director of the genocide survivors group Ibuka242 observes:
"Gacaca is a compromise political solution, but at this point, it is all we have to
look forward to."243
Although the scholarship concerning the Gacaca courts has yet to be fully
developed,2" what is known is that it is a community-based form of alterative
239. Ironside, supra note 218, at 39.
240. L. Danielle Tully, Human Rights Compliance and the Gacaca Jurisdictions in Rwanda, 26 B.C.
INT'L & CoMp. L. REv. 385, 386 (2003).
241. See QUESTION OF JUSTICE, supra note 214, at 2 ("[The gacaca system is] an ambitious,
groundbreaking attempt to restore the Rwandese social fabric torn by armed conflict and genocide by locating
the trial of those alleged to have participated in the genocide within the communities in which the offenses
were committed."); Ironside, supra note 218, at 33-34 ("[un the context of post-genocidal Rwanda, Gacaca
may well be able to heal the deep wounds that continue to divide the country by ethnicity in a manner for
which Western retributive systems are not designed. Indeed, it is unrealistic, impractical and short-sighted
to rely solely on the ordinary criminal model with all of its due process guarantees to address mass
perpetration of crimes, particularly in a country whose judicial system has to be build ex nihilo and where
ethnic tensions continue to run high."); Radha Webley, Gacaca and Reconciliation in Post-Genocide Rwanda
1 (2004) (unpublished manuscript), ("When I left for Rwanda, I was extremely hopeful. Most of the reports
and analyses I had read on the subject were overwhelmingly positive, both in relation to the potential of the
gacaca courts as a reconciliatory initiative and in relation to the process of reconciliation overall in Rwanda.").
available at http://www.hrcberkely.org/download/rport_wradha.pdf. (last visited Oct. 6, 2005).
242. Ibuka means "remember" in Kinyarwanda. See Prevent Genocide.Org, Kinyarwanda and
Rwanda Links, available at http://preventgenocide.org/rw/links.html. (last visited Oct. 6, 2005).
243. Borland, supra note 233, at 2.
244. See Tully, supra note 240, at 395 ("Relatively little is known about the practice of gacaca...
[which was] a community-based dispute resolution forum[] in pre-colonial Rwanda.").
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dispute resolution that developed in the pre-colonial period.2 45  The term
"Gacaca" connotes "lawn," which indicates the manner in which the members
of a Gacaca court would sit on the grass while listening to disputes brought
before the community.2" Significantly, the Gacaca courts consistently "main-
tained restitution and reconciliation as their primary aims." '247 Although
sanctions (such as compensation) were introduced for an offense, imprisonment
was not an option, and the sanctions were meant to educate the perpetrator
regarding the gravity of the offense as well as reintegrate the accused into his
or her community.2 48 In similar vein to the TRC, genocide suspects who confess
fully to their crimes will have their initial sentence halved; moreover, all
suspects tried in the Gacaca system may serve half of their sentence doing
community service rather than in prison. 9 Since many suspects have now
spent ten years in prison, many of those tried under the Gacaca system will not
remain imprisoned but may return to their communities. ° In its temporal
structure, the Gacaca system develops in four phases: first, raising awareness
and increasing knowledge about the law;25" ' second, election of judges from the
community; third, "confession, testimony, and reconciliation," and fourth,
reintegration of some prisoners back into the society through a work program. 2
Today, the Gacaca system is split into sections to adjudicate different categories
of crimes, with varying degrees of severity: at the lowest (village) level, the
court will only adjudicate property crimes (category 4 crimes); the sector and
district Gacaca courts will try more serious crimes (category 3 and 2 crimes);
those accused of ordering killings or rape (category 1 crimes) will be tried in
conventional courts.253
The restorative aims of the Gacaca system, as well as the community
atmosphere of the court system, defined the types of disputes relevant to the
courts. Traditionally, these disputes would concern "inheritance, civil liability,
failure to repay loans, thefts, . . . conjugal matters ... and minor criminal
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 396 (emphasis added).
248. Id.
249. Webley, supra note 241, at 5 n.5.
250. Id.
251. See Borland, supra note 233, at 2 ("One project ... involved producing and distributing films,
radio broadcasts and other media to help spread information aboutgacaca. In this project, Rwandans watched
a film about gacaca elections, more than 200,000 read a cartoon strip on the same topic, and an estimated 2.7
million people were exposed to radio messages about gacaca.").
252. Id.
253. Brittain, supra note 235. Although category I cases will not be tried in gacaca courts, gacaca
judges take testimony as part of the category I process. Borland, supra note 233, at 2.
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offenses such as theft.,' 25 4 Notably, these community-based courts thus appear
to have been formed for the purpose of reinstating those accused of minor
relational offenses, as opposed to the inexpressibly violent crimes committed
during the 1994 genocide. Throughout the evolution of the Gacaca court system
from the pre-colonial period onward,255 the emphasis remained on disputes
"between family members or neighbors," while disputes with strangers were
more likely to be heard in state tribunals.256 Precisely since the Gacaca system
was not originally meant to adjudicate the types of crimes committed during the
1994 genocide, when the Transitional National Assembly of Rwanda adopted
Gacaca Law on October 12, 200, the current Gacaca system is conceptually
distinguished from the traditional practice. 7  According to the Rwandan
government, these Gacaca jurisdictions will try crimes that occurred between
October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994.25' Ultimately, the goal is to have
10,000 Gacaca jurisdictions in Rwanda composed of individuals elected by the
immediate community,259 and judgments will be made either by consensus or
by majority voting.26°
C. The Politics of Reconciliation in Rwanda
On April 7, 2004, Rwanda remembered the ten-year anniversary of the
1994 genocide. However, despite the passage of a decade, Rwanda continues
to struggle in its attempts to rebuild a nation ravaged financially, politically, and
emotionally:
254. Tully, supra note 240, at 395-96.
255. See id. at 396 ("During the colonial period beginning in 1897, first the Germans and then the
Belgians introduced a more formal state-centered legal system in Rwandan society.... [L]egal pluralism
evolved with gacaca, on the one hand, as an indigenous procedure based largely on traditional values and
determining standards of individual and community behavior, and state laws, on the other hand, which were
based predominantly on the Belgian framework.").
256. Id. at 397.
257. See id. at 397-98. (In an attempt to distinguish the current gacaca concept from the traditional
concept, the Rwandan government often refers to today's system as "modernized gacaca" or "gacaca
jurisdictions.").
258. Id. at 398.
259. See Tully, supra note 240, at 398 ("Each gacaca jurisdiction will have a General Assembly, a
Bench, and a Coordinating Committee.... The General Assembly of each cellule [the smallest administrative
unit in the country] will then elect twenty-four people over the age of twenty-one of'high integrity.' Of these
twenty-four individuals, five will be selected to serve as delegates to the General Assembly at the Secteur level
and nineteen will remain to serve on the Bench at the cellule level. Out of those nineteen who remain at the
Cellule level, the Bench will elect five of its own members to serve on the Coordinating Committee.").
260. Id. at 399.
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There are 80,000 detainees in Rwanda's overcrowded prisons, some
of whom are allegedly innocent, [awaiting] a fair trial. In some cases,
their families and their home communities remain unconvinced that
they will get one. Victims and survivors of the genocide also wait for
justice and compensation for the human rights abuses they have
suffered. Women and girls, in particular, were left infected with HIV
or were left with permanent health complications and disease as a
result of the brutal sexual violence they suffered. There are hundreds
of thousands of Rwandese refugees who returned home involuntarily
in the aftermath of the genocide to an unknown future, [and] another
60,000 remain outside Rwanda unsure if they want to return and
afraid that their return may be forced.26'
For many, the Gacaca system seems to be the panacea after years of legal
backlog and lack of resolution concerning the crimes committed in 1994.262
Often, the language of accolade used in describing the possibilities of the
Gacaca system is strikingly similar to that used to describe the TRC in South
Africa.263 For example, in their 2001 text Restorative Justice and Civil Society,
Heather Strang and John Braithwaite write: "For such profound collective
wrongs as genocide and apartheid, the world is slowly learning that
undominated and state-assisted storytelling is needed, so that truth can lay a
foundation for reconciliation."'2" In its rhetoric, the Rwandan government has
261. AMNEsTY INTERNATIONAL, RWANDA: THE ENDURING LEGACY OF THE GENOCIDE AND WAR 1
(2004), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR470082004 (last visited May 10, 2004).
262. See, e.g., Ironside, supra note 218, at 34 ("To date, criminal prosecutions have been the sole
method by which justice has been sought for post-genocidal Rwanda. This is premised on the perhaps
misplaced faith that accountability and reconciliation can only be achieved through a Western-conceived
adversarial trial model, and that individual criminal accountability pursued against a select few will
'exonerate' the collective."); Tully, supra note 240, at 413-14 ("lit is undisputed that the system of justice
that Rwanda has maintained for over five years has failed. With over 100,000 pre-trial detainees languishing
in over-crowded prisons and local cachots, a compromise is unavoidable.... In the face of this daunting
situation, the new gacaca jurisdictions have emerged as Rwanda's newest, and certainly most innovative, hope
for justice and reconciliation.").
263. See Brittain, supra note 235 ("Gacaca, with its emphasis on collective truth-telling as a means
toward reconciliation rather than summaryjustice and punishment, has more elements in common with South
Africa's traveling Truth and Reconciliation Commission of the 1990s than with, say, Latin American versions
following dictatorships, such as Peru's."); Daly, supra note 5, at 167 ("The actual, if unrecognized, need for
reconciliation may be as strong in Rwanda as it is in South Africa, though it manifests itself quite
differently."); Can the Gacaca Courts Deliver Justice?, SOUTH AFRICAN PRESS AssOC., Apr. 8, 2004, 2004
WLNR 7090283 [hereinafter Gacaca Courts Deliver Justice] ("[Robert Bayigamba, Minister of Culture,
Youth and Sports declares that the gacaca system was intended] to accelerate the process of knowing the truth
so that justice may be done.").
264. Borland, supra note 233, at 6 (quoting HEATHER STRANG & JOHN BmArrHwArrE, RESTORATIVE
JUSTICE AND CIVIL SOCIETY 11 (2001).
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been quick to portray the Gacaca system as a beacon of hope for the future-
currently, national advertisement posters for the Gacaca system read "The Truth
Heals" and "depict a bright yellow sun rising over the hills of Rwanda with
villagers holding hands as they move from the dark toward the rising sun." '265
In part, this focus on restorative justice in Rwanda is a reaction against the poor
results from the retributive justice campaign initiated by the Rwandan
government after the genocide.266  The reaction of some scholars-and
particularly advocates of the TRCs ideology-has been to promote the
possibility of reconciliation in Rwanda. As Erin Daly, law professor at Widener
University, writes: "clearly, if Rwanda is to survive, reconciliation can not wait
200 years267 and must be promoted in conjunction with Rwanda's other
immediate needs. 268 In this portion of the discussion, this article seeks to
substantiate a critique of the Gacaca courts as undergoing a similar reification
into metanarrative status as the evolution of the South African TRC.269 Toward
that end, this article will examine the political and economic forces behind the
Gacaca courts, and conduct an objective analysis of the current state of that
system.
First, the question of whether the Gacaca courts will ever be functional is
a real one. Although the Gacaca court initiative began in June 2002, it has yet
to become operational beyond a few pilot models.270 In the first phase of its
implementation, a USAID-funded study found that "while awareness is high,
knowledge about the functioning of jurisdictions and the specific role of the
community is rather limited., 271 Moreover, as a result of several delays, training
265. Ironside, supra note 218, at 47.
266. See Daly, supra note 5, at 165-66 ("The government has embarked on an extensive campaign
of arresting and incarcerating suspects believed to have participated, in any way, in the genocide. The result
has been disastrous. It is estimated that 125,000 individuals are in jails or community 'cachots' (literally
hiding places) while only 3000 trials have taken place. Thousands are dying of disease and malnutrition while
the wheels ofjustice turn ever so slowly.").
267. Daly, supra note 5 at 166 (The Rwandan government estimates that at the current rate of
adjudication, it will take over 200 years to try all of the genocide suspects currently imprisoned).
268. Id. at 166-67.
269. Although there are substantial due process concerns with the gacaca system, this Article focuses
more narrowly on a theoretical critique of gacaca law. See Ironside, supra note 218, at 51-56 (analyzing
concerns for gacaca defendants, such as: the right to a fair hearing by a competent, independent and impartial
tribunal, the right to have adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense and consult with counsel, and the
right to review by a higher tribunal).
270. See Borland, supra note 233, at 3 ("As of November 2002, twenty-six pilot courts had begun
hearing testimony.").
271. Id. at 2 (quoting S. Gabisirege and S. Babalola, Johns Hopkins University, Center for
Communications Programs, PERCEPTIONS ABOUT THE GACACA LAW IN RWANDA: EVIDENCE FORM A MULTI-
METHOD STUDY (2002), available at http://www.jhuccp.org/pubs/sp/19/English/19.pdf (last visited Oct. 6,
2005).
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of judges did not begin until April 2002.272 Pilot courts were not inaugurated
until July 2002; four years after the first mention of a Gacaca system,273 and
even afterward, community participation in the Gacaca courts have been lower
than initially predicted.274
On an ideological basis, it is possible to argue that the current
manifestation of the Gacaca court system is not the community-based,
traditional system that is being lauded by the international community.275 In his
on-site research for Amnesty International, Richard Haavisto describes latent
concerns about Rwanda's Gacaca court system, and in particular, the lack of full
community participation.276 When the pilot models began three years ago,
community members often failed to attend trials, or did not provide testimony
if they did attend.277 The initial interest in Gacaca law has "dropped markedly"
since the pilot models began, and often, weekly Gacaca meeting must be
canceled as a result of a failure to meet the one hundred person quorum
requirement. 278  According to Haavisto, fear is often a factor in dividing
communities and malcontent concerning the Gacaca courts: "Many of those
who might be willing to give evidence are afraid of retribution." '279 The
retribution factor is real, for while the TRC addressed crimes on the part of both
the resistance movement and the Nationalist Party, the Gacaca system only deals
with crimes committed by the "genocidaires," and not members of the Rwandan
Patriotic Front, who gained control of Rwanda after the end of the 1994
genocide.28 Although the government has sought to affirm that witnesses will
272. Id at 3.
273. Id.
274. Id
275. See Ironside, supra note 218, at 59 ("[T]he Gacaca system's emphasis on restorative modes of
justice, through participative story-telling, atonement, public scrutiny, and reintegrative community service,
provide post-genocide Rwanda's best hope for progressing toward national reconciliation and some greater
sense of justice."); Webley, supra note 241, at 8 ("[U]niversal participation is one of the theoretical
underpinnings of the gacaca system itself, for such participation is seen as the central mechanism for making
the dual processes of justice and of reconciliation not only institutional projects but felt realities in the lives
of the Rwandan people.").
276. See Gacaca Courts Deliver Justice, supra note 263.
277. Id.
278. Webley, supra note 241, at 5.
279. See Gacaca Courts Deliver Justice, supra note 263 ("[Tjhere have been reports in the last few
years of killings and attacks on witnesses who were expected to testify in gacaca courts."); Borland, supra
note 233, at 3 ("Both inside and outside Rwanda, people of all ethnic groups fear the outbreak of renewed
violence. Some witnesses are afraid they will be attacked if they speak the truth."); Webley, supra note 241,
at 5 (describing one gacaca court where survivors refused to account for known genocidaires because the
murderers "had never been imprisoned but were still living in the community in question").
280. Gacaca Courts Deliver Justice, supra note 263. U.N. consultant Robert Gersony found that "the
RPF had engaged in widespread and systematic slaughter of unarmed civilians." Id. The NGO Penal Reform
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be protected, "no clear security mechanism has been established to protect
community witnesses who testify'... and Rwandans have little reason at present
to believe they will be protected."28' One Rwandan woman, Mbezuanda, was
victimized by the Hutu militia, but remains terrified of testifying in a public
court because it will be "her word against the accused... there are no other
witnesses., 28 2 Concerned that the wheels of justice move far too slowly to
protect her, she believes that it would be dangerous to provide evidence:
"Maybe by the time it comes I will be dead.""2 3  With many in these
communities fearful of involvement and perceiving the tribunals themselves as
one-sided, there is little implicit confidence in the system.2" As Haavisto notes,
"The government has to create a climate which convinces people that there is
an equitable system of justice at work., 285 For the several thousand Rwandan
refugees currently in other countries, without a sufficient promise that they will
be protected, voluntary return is unlikely.
286
The possibility of a true "community"-based system post-genocide
becomes further complicated in light of the historical disconnect between the
community that experienced the persecution and that which is initiating the trial.
Causing a fundamental rift is the reality that an enormous part of the population
was involved in the genocide. As Elizabeth Onyango, of the non-governmental
organization (NGO) African Rights observes: "[i]n Rwanda you have a
situation in which a large part of the population participated in the genocide.
A select few might have orchestrated it, but they did it so cleverly that they got
a lot of the population implicated-and how do you try cases like this, all these
people? '287  Although it could be argued that despite reconfiguration, the
prosecutions are still taking place, the fundamental appeal of the Gacaca system
for the international community was not merely the prosecutions, but the
restorative ethos of the system. Will the "community" receive the perpetrator
back into its midst after he or she serves the maximum time required by Gacaca
law? The sentiments of at least one survivor toward the Gacaca system suggest
otherwise:
International noted in a recent report: "There is a growing disenchantment with the first phase of the gacaca
pilots: the number of participants is going down and many participants no longer express themselves during
the meetings. The enthusiasm of some people has diminished considerably when they realized that Gacaca
could not investigate the past." Borland, supra note 233, at 4.
281. Borland, supra note 233, at 3.




286. Borland, supra note 233, at 3.
287. Gacaca Courts Deliver Justice, supra note 263.
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They killed us, completely finished us. Some of them were arrested
and imprisoned, but recently they were released even though they had
killed us. We had assumed that they would be killed the same way
they killed us. So for us, we don't understand Gacaca... The people
who killed us are being released. Those who are not being released
we hear they will be imprisoned for life. There they eat, they live
alright and grow old like normal people. We don't see the benefits
for us in that process. They should have died the way we died.2"'
Another problematic feature of the Gacaca systems is the same as that which
underlies South Africa's TRC as well-the often-indistinguishable lines
between oral confession and memory, confession and truth. In Rwanda, like
South Africa and most other African nations, there is a long history of oral
tradition, where stories can be perpetuated for generations without written
record.289 As a result, "people tend to blur the lines between what they have
seen themselves, and what others have told them."29 The oral tradition can then
have a distinct impact on judicial proceedings, whether restorative or retributive.
For example, in the ICTR, lawyers have recounted stories of how intense cross-
examination of a witness can, days later, lead to the damaging revelation that
"he did not actually see the event himself.... But his wife's aunt did.""29 In the
Gacaca courts, similar problems can surface. Describing her experience at a
Gacaca court in the village of Kigese, journalist Victoria Brittain writes: "[a]s
the hours went on, contradictory stories were told, and witnesses and defendants
went off on irrelevant stories. Many times someone in the general assembly
rose to ask the chairman to keep the witnesses to the point."'2 92 Certainly, some
have argued that both the Gacaca system and the TRC allow for justice through
cathartic confession and the opportunity to offer a personal narrative: "[t]o have
your story of unjust suffering entered into a public record and thence into future
history-writing is to experience an increment ofjustice."'2 93 However,just as the
288. Webley, supra note 241, at 4.
289. See Rwanda's Slow Justice, BBC NEWS (May 19, 2001) available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/programmes/from-our-own-correspondent/1338263.stm. (lastvisitedOct. 6,2005)
[hereinafter Slow Justice]; but see Gacaca Courts Deliver Justice, supra note 271("[As Elizabeth Onyango
notes:] Rwanda is a society where people, because of all they've been through ... don't really speak up.
Gacaca does give people a chance to begin to talk about genocide.").
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Brittain, supra note 235.
293. Borland, supra note 233, at 10 (quoting Donald Shriver, Where and When in Political Life is
Justice Served by Forgiveness?, in BURYING THE PAST: MAKING PEACE AND DOING JUSTICE AFrER CIVIL
CONFLICT 28 (Nigel Bigger, ed., 2001).
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TRC struggles with the question of whether confession and repentance can be
fairly conflated, genocide survivors are equally wary of the sincerity of suspects
in the Gacaca system.294 As one woman noted, prisoners who had returned into
her community professed openly that if another genocide occurred, the "only
thing they would do differently is to make sure to kill all of the Tutsis."2 95
Ultimately, the dubious distinction between fact and fiction prolongs the judicial
process and complicates the possibility for reconciliation.
The notion of community-based reconciliation becomes complicated when
raising the question of whether "living together again," one of the catchphrases
of the Rwandan government's reconciliation rhetoric, is currently at work.29
The ostensibly restorative aim of Gacaca law manifest through a community
dialogue is a key political tool for the Rwandan government at a time when the
international community is heavily invested in the restorative justice model.
The Rwandan government has been vocal in its claim that the community-based
Gacaca courts are the centerpiece of a reconciliation process-as one
government official notes:
[Gacaca] is the biggest single investment in the reconciliation
process. As soon as the victims of genocide see punishment for the
perpetrators of genocide, they are ready to forgive. As soon as those
who are in prison are facilitated to get out, to be tried, and to be rein-
serted into community, to do community service as part of the
project, then you are building the bridges for conflict management,
you are building the bridges for reconciliation, things have started
gain. So gacaca is therefore tied to the reconciliation process, as soon
as both parties to this unfortunate divide see that justice is being
done.297
Officially, the Rwandan government insists that reconciliation is already
beginning in Rwanda, and that "reconciliation [is] a process that can be both
successfully engineered and successfully completed within a finite period of
time." 9 However, there is a fundamental disconnect between the government
rhetoric concerning the gacaca court system and how Rwandans view the
methods.29
294. See Webley, supra note 241, at 10 ("Many... feel that... requests for forgiveness, as well as
the confessions themselves, are wholly insincere, and emphasize that unless they are accompanied by true
remorse, they will mean nothing, and will not in any way contribute to the process of reconciliation.").
295. Id. at 9.
296. Id. at 3.
297. Jd. at 4.
298. Id. at 2.
299. Webley, supra note 241, at 4.
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A primary feature of this disconnect between the official perspective on
gacaca law and that of the Rwandan people is the fact that the gacaca courts are
explicitly state-run. Among many Rwandans, there is a prevailing suspicion
that the gacaca system is merely a "government-run attempt to deal with a six-
figure prison population., 3° The manner in which the gacaca system currently
operates is effectively "top-down," a factor that subverts the purposes of
reconciliation and nation-building at the heart of the government's rhetoric.
30 1
For example, at weekly gacaca meetings, armed security forces are often
present, and coerced participation is "a relatively frequent trend. 30 2 In their
involvement during the gacaca process, district, sector, and national-level
officials tended to be the voices driving the sessions, as opposed to merely
possessing an administrative role.30 3 Effectively, the gacaca courts are enacting
state-sponsored retribution rather than the restorative aims they profess. °4
It is necessary to ask, further, whether there is, in fact, a gacaca system in
Rwanda, or whether the pilot models are merely political mirages that will
enable a poor state to collect money and military support from the West without
moving any of the prisoners out. Since the gacaca system is being marketed to
the international community as traditional African justice, it remains somewhat
unassailable, because no external state will feel comfortable critiquing "African"
justice.'35 For example, while the public position of the United States on the
Gacaca systems has been categorically positive, the United States has a political
stake in promoting a nationally oriented and controlled justice for international
crimes as a position against international tribunals. Ironically, while the gacaca
system may be Rwanda's carrot for economic aid from the international
community, the gacaca courts themselves may prove a financial strain of the
communities they purport to serve, particularly since most individuals do not
receive compensation for their involvement." 6
300. Id.
301. Id. at 8.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. See Webley, supra note 241, at 10 ("[T]he government is actively manipulating the rhetoric of
reconciliation in ways that seem to have little to do with a desire to actually further the process of
reconciliation and that appear to have more to do with consolidating its own political power.").
305. But see Brittain, supra note 235 ("[G]acaca has come in for harsh criticism as unworkable from
some sections of the donor community. How can untrained and mainly illiterate peasants be trusted with the
judgment of tangled tales often involving their own relations? Where is the administrative capacity to process
100,000 dossiers or more? What will happen to the approximately halfa million new suspects, now at large,
named already in suspects' confessions during the gacaca process of the past few months? What does the
election as judges of some people known to have been active participants in the genocide say about the
fairness of the trials?").




At a time when nations rebuild and transition under the scrutiny of the
international community, a new pressure exists to model a transitional justice
that accommodates the political and ideological interests of other states.
Particularly because the judicial model of a broken state can rarely operate
without the economic backing and political involvement of other countries, it
is nearly impossible to conceptually sever the issues central to restorative and
retributive justice from political aims. Today, nations such as Rwanda and
South Africa showcase the extent to which restorative justice has captured the
approval of the global community. However, as this article argues, not only do
the politico-economic contexts of South Africa's TRC and the Rwandan gacaca
system powerfully shape each nation's restorative rhetoric, the ideological aims
of these models may ultimately prove insufficient tools for nation-building.
Since the inauguration of South Africa's TRC, a fundamental shift has
occurred in the international perspective on transitional justice-ajurisprudence
of forgiveness and reconciliation has emerged as a dominant motif. As this
article contends, while the emphasis on the restorative rhetoric of reconciliation
and truth-telling may be compelling, the current situation may be one in which
the reality of what restorative justice has effected may be in disjunction with the
popular response. Complicating the narrative ethos of reconciliation narratives
are a number of foundational questions: Whose story should be heard? Is a
changing story necessarily a fiction? Is the storytelling merely cathartic or a
symptom of repentance?
For South Africans, the TRC may have been a cathartic process of sorts,
but the metanarrative of restorative justice now accepted by most of the inter-
national community does not account for the less-reconciliatory political
realities which drove and continue to define the Commission's legacy. This
article has sought to warn of the dangers of a categorical acceptance of restora-
tive justice as a panacea, and establish a more productive critique of how these
metanarratives develop, and on what grounds.
The ten-year anniversary of the Rwandan genocide recently passed, and it
is clear that Rwanda is a state that has been influenced by the restorative justice
metanarrative. While the gacaca system is a middle ground model-with both
retributive and restorative attributes-it is largely the restorative aims of gacaca
law that are being advertised internationally and nationally.
Despite the best of intentions, true nation-building and reconciliation will
only develop from a less categorical and more critical understanding of the
interplay of restoration, retribution, and the political state.
